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SPECIALIZED TRIAL COURTS IN PATENT 
LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF THE PATENT 
PILOT PROGRAM’S IMPACT ON 
APPELLATE REVERSAL RATES AT THE 
FIVE-YEAR MARK 
AMY SEMET* 
Abstract: Do specialized trial court judges make more accurate decisions in 
patent law cases? In 2011, Congress passed a law setting up a ten-year pilot 
program to enhance expertise in patent litigation by funneling more trial court 
decisions to fourteen select district courts. Now that the five-year mark has 
passed, has the program had its intended effect of increasing accuracy, as 
measured by less reversal of pilot judges by the Federal Circuit? This Article 
analyzes trial court patent cases filed from September 2011 through Septem-
ber 2016, focusing specifically on whether the appellate treatment of cases 
heard by district court judges participating in the pilot program differs from 
the treatment of cases heard by non-pilot judges. Of the several hundred cases 
where the Federal Circuit rules on the substantive patent law issues on appeal, 
the results indicate that, even controlling for other factors, the Federal Circuit 
does not overrule non-pilot judges more than pilot judges. After discussing the 
empirical results, the Article proposes suggestions for reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
Patent law stands out as an obscure area of law, raising questions about 
the capabilities of generalist judges and lay juries to accurately resolve pa-
tent disputes.1 Although such cases comprise less than 1% of the overall 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2019, Amy Semet. All rights reserved. 
 * Postdoctoral Research Associate, Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton 
University. I would like to thank participants at the 2017 PATCON conference at Northwestern 
Pritzker School of Law for their helpful comments on this Article, particularly Christopher Sea-
man, who served as a discussant, and David Schwartz, who offered helpful comments. I would 
also like to thank Vasundhara Prasad, Lauren Koster, and Lauren Allen at Boston College Law 
Review for their work on this Article. This Article was cited by Colleen Chien in the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet hearing on the Supreme Court’s T.C. Heart-
land, LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brand LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017). Hearing on the Su-
preme Court’s TC Heartland Decision Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the 
Internet of the H. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Colleen Chien, Professor, 
Santa Clara University School of Law). 
 1 Lawrence M. Sung, Strangers in a Strange Land: Specialized Courts Resolving Patent Dis-
putes, 17 BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 27, 27; see Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, 
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federal docket, the technical complexity of patent cases results in trial judg-
es spending a disproportionate amount of time learning the law as well as 
mastering the technology of the patent.2 Scholars have increasingly tried to 
analyze statistically whether judges with more experience differ in the way 
they decide patent cases.3 After years of debate, the U.S. Congress passed a 
law in 2011 establishing a pilot program to leverage federal judge expertise 
in patent law cases.4 The new system assumes that judges with more experi-
ence will make better decisions and will adjudicate cases faster while facing 
shorter learning curves.5 Volunteers for the program, which is scheduled to 
run ten years, were selected from the fifteen judicial district courts that 
heard the greatest number of patent cases in 2010.6 
This Article examines the workings of the program at the halfway 
mark to test the pilot program’s success and to gauge whether specialized 
patent judges render more correct decisions that are less likely to be dis-
turbed on appeal. Part I details the terminology of patent law and explains 
how patent litigation unfolds in the court system.7 Patent litigation is 
unique, because appeals are heard by a specialized appellate court in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) stationed in Wash-
ington, D.C.8 Over the years, certain trial courts have emerged as de facto 
specialized courts, hearing more patent cases than their sister district 
courts.9 Part II dissects the empirical findings of earlier research on the in-
                                                                                                                           
Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication; An Empirical Analy-
sis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 394–95 & 395 
n.1 (2011) (citing Sung, supra). 
 2 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007); see Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 408 (discussing the impact 
of specialization on court efficiency). 
 3 See generally Kesan & Ball, supra note 1 (setting forth an empirical study on judicial expe-
rience and specialization). 
 4 Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); see, e.g., Kesan & Ball, 
supra note 1, at 395–96 (outlining the debate surrounding a specialized patent trial court). 
 5 See 153 CONG. REC. 3714 (2007) (documenting remarks by Representative Howard Coble 
on the need for judicial experience in patent law cases). 
 6 Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(b)(2)(A)(i), (c), 124 Stat. at 3675. 
 7 See infra notes 19–98 and accompanying text. 
 8 See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two 
Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 (2010) (describing creation of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”)). 
 9 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-490, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT 
OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS INCENTIVES, AND IMPROVE CLARITY 16 (2016) 
[hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.] (noting that the Eastern District of Texas experi-
enced an increase in patent infringement suits). For instance, in 2015, the Eastern District of Texas 
heard about 50% of cases involving defendants in patent infringement cases. See id. at 16, 17 
fig.3. The District of Delaware is the second most popular district in which to bring a patent in-
fringement suit. See id. at 17 fig.3 (representing graphically the counts of defendants in patent 
infringement cases from 2007–2015). 
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ner-workings of specialized patent courts.10 Then, Part III discusses the pre-
sent empirical project, describing the data, the data collection, and the 
summary findings.11 Next, Part IV undertakes a statistical analysis to test 
the hypothesis of whether judges designated as pilot judges perform “bet-
ter” compared to non-designated judges as measured by their respective 
CAFC reversal rates.12 In particular, this Part discusses the significant 
methodological difficulties in undertaking the present analysis, including a 
discussion of the selection effects that urge caution in stating definitive 
findings on the workings of the pilot program.13 Finally, Part V deciphers 
the results and offers proposals for reform of the current system.14 
Overall, the empirical analysis presented here indicates that, thus far, 
the pilot program has not resulted in pilot judges being reversed less often 
on appeal after accounting for other factors. The results indicate that judi-
cial experience influences reversal rates but in an unexpected way. While 
participation in the pilot does not affect reversal rates, judges who previous-
ly sat by designation at the CAFC were less likely to get reversed on appeal 
in certain instances, suggesting that past experience has some impact on 
outcomes. Pilot judges fare no better than non-pilot judges, even when con-
trolling for legal issues addressed, procedural posture, and experience, 
among other variables.15 But, cases are not necessarily decided the same 
way in pilot and non-pilot districts. Rather, pilot judges—who often have 
more patent-law experience than non-pilot judges—are somewhat better at 
encouraging settlement, though these differences vary based on technology, 
issue, and procedural posture.16  
The results of this study call into question whether alternatives, in ad-
dition to the pilot program, are necessary to increase certainty and efficien-
cy in patent litigation. The shift in recent years to allow for inter partes re-
view of patents—a procedure through which parties can challenge the valid-
ity of a patent before administrative judges at the Patent and Trademark Ap-
peals Board (“PTAB”) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”)—may be a good first step in giving more power to the 
USPTO.17 Unlike many other areas of law, courts—even specialized 
courts—may not have the resources or technical know-all to engage effec-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 99–161 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 162–221 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 222–300 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 275–300 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 301–391 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 231–300 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges Deciding 
Patent Cases?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1151 (2014) (finding “that judges with more patent expe-
rience are less likely to rule for patentees on infringement, though not on validity”). 
 17 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018) (establishing who may request review and how). 
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tively in making patent policy and devising rules that balance property 
rights and innovation. Although specialized patent trial courts may be a 
needed first step in reform, the time is ripe to start thinking about whether 
the patent system needs to be re-altered fundamentally to give greater rule-
making authority and responsibility back to the USPTO or some other ex-
pert administrative agency.18 
I. PATENT LAW SPECIALIZATION 
A. Basics of Patent Law 
Patents confer a right on patentees to prevent others from “making, us-
ing, . . . or selling” the patented invention in question.19 To determine patent 
rights, adjudicators engage in a process called claim construction in which a 
judge determines the meaning of the patent’s terms as defined by the pa-
tent’s claims.20 For example, one claim among the hundreds of patents and 
patent applications covering the Apple iPhone (in its past, current, or future 
forms) states that “[a]n electronic device may have a flexible portion that 
allows the device to be folded.”21 
When constructing claims, courts first interpret the intrinsic evidence 
of the patent, which includes the language of the claims; the specification of 
the patent, encompassing the written description of the claimed invention 
and the disclosure of the preferred embodiment; and, the patent’s prosecu-
tion history, including written correspondence between the patentees or the 
patentees’ lawyers with the USPTO during the patent prosecution process.22 
If the intrinsic evidence is unclear, courts may then consider extrinsic evi-
dence, such as dictionary definitions, treatises, expert testimony, or other 
evidence that the court believes relevant to the job of interpreting the 
claims.23 Trial courts review patent claims as a matter of law.24 Appeals 
courts review claim constructions de novo but subsidiary factual questions 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of 
Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1775, 1782 (2017) (arguing for automatic administrative re-
view at the onset of a patent litigation amid calls for reform of the system). 
 19 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018) (describing patentee’s right to exclude); id. § 271(a) (list-
ing actions that constitute patent infringement). Cohen et al. explore the basics of patent law and 
its accompanying proceeds in their 2017 article. See Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 1783–90. 
 20 Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 21 See U.S. Patent No. 20,170,336,831, at [54], [57], [71] (filed Sept. 22, 2016) (listing Apple, 
Inc. as the applicant and covering “electronic devices with flexible displays”). 
 22 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 5 & nn.19–20 (2001). 
 23 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing when the judge may rely upon extrinsic evidence). 
 24 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
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for clear error.25 Courts should construe terms by their “plain and ordinary 
meaning to one of skill in the art” unless the intrinsic evidence dictates oth-
erwise.26 
The Patent Act of 1952 is written broadly, allowing inventors to have 
patents on any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter . . . .”27 Many disputes in patent litigation concern whether 
one party infringed another’s patents, and in turn whether those patents are 
invalid due to being anticipated or made obvious by the prior inventions of 
others, or whether the patents should be rendered unenforceable due to the 
patentee’s fraud before the USPTO during prosecution, an allegation known 
as inequitable conduct.28 Additionally, patentees can file for a preliminary 
injunction to stop further infringement of the patent.29 Such an analysis re-
quires the judge to consider not only the likelihood of success on the merits 
but also irreparable harm.30 Motions for preliminary injunctions can quickly 
escalate into “mini-trial[s]” involving claim construction as that the judge 
must opine on validity and infringement in order to determine the likelihood 
of success on the injunction motion.31 In addition to injunctive relief, a pa-
tentee who prevails in an infringement action can recover “damages ade-
quate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a rea-
sonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together 
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”32 If patentees prevail on in-
fringement claims, they may also be entitled to treble damages.33 
The adjudicatory structure for patent law disputes is unique in Ameri-
can law.34 Regional generalist district courts undertake trials of patent litiga-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). 
 26 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018) (requiring “a written description of the invention” detailed 
enough “to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same”); see also Moore, supra note 22, at 6 (discussing conven-
tions of claim interpretation). 
 27 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 28 Id. §§ 271(a), 282; see id. §§ 102–103 (describing the “conditions for patentability” and 
potential invalidity); John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff: Inequitable Conduct, the Federal 
Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 353, 354 (2012) (defining the defense of 
inequitable conduct). Defenses, such as inequitable conduct, must be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 
 29 Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent Pilot Program’s 
Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 221 (2009); see 35 
U.S.C. § 283 (2018) (establishing the boundaries of injunctions). 
 30 Shartzer, supra note 29, at 221 & nn.271–72. 
 31 Id. at 221–22.  
 32 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018). 
 33 See id. (providing judges with discretion). 
 34 Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: 
The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839, 841–42 
(2009). 
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tion, but appellate jurisdiction rests in the specialized CAFC in Washington, 
D.C.35 In 1982, the appellate dockets of the U.S. Court of Customs and Pa-
tent Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims combined to form the CAFC, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent disputes.36 The im-
petus behind the CAFC’s formation was to ensure uniform application of 
the nation’s patent laws since regional appellate courts greatly differed in 
how they ruled in patent cases, causing alarm in the business community for 
the unpredictability of patent rulings.37 Of particular concern was the nega-
tive impact on economic and industrial growth stemming from “inconsist-
encies in judge-made patent law.”38 Today, one-third of the CAFC’s docket 
concerns patent law cases, taking up a disproportionate share of the court’s 
time relative to other cases due to the complexity posed by patent dis-
putes.39 This complexity stems not only from the technical sophistication of 
the cases, but also from the increased interrelation with other areas of law 
that touch on patent issues, such as antitrust law.40 Indeed, the Federal Judi-
cial Center (“FJC”) notes the burden that patent litigation imposes on courts 
due to its complexity and cost, placing it fourth in terms of time burden, 
behind only death penalty habeas cases, environmental cases, and civil cas-
es under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.41 
Scholars offer differing opinions on whether the CAFC has achieved 
its goals of fostering uniformity and discouraging forum shopping.42 Judge 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Golden, supra note 8, at 555 & n.15 (describing the uniqueness of the CAFC). 
 36 See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 
513, 521 (1992) (detailing the history of the cases now heard by the CAFC). 
 37 See James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust Restraints in 
the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 139 (2001) (describing the purpose of the 
legislation creating the CAFC); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uni-
formity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2007) (outlining Congress’s concerns with 
regionalism); Newman, supra note 36, at 516 (recalling the impetus for creating a court with spe-
cialized patent review). As Judge Pauline Newman wrote, “the fate of duly examined and issued 
patents had become so uncertain in the courts as to place a cloud on patent-based investment.” 
Newman, supra note 36, at 516. 
 38 Newman, supra note 36, at 517. 
 39 See 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007) (citing complexity of cases as a reason for the pilot pro-
gram’s creation); Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to 
Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1180–81, 1194 (1999) (noting that about 
one-third of the CAFC’s docket consists of patent cases but they can take require upwards of ten 
times more work than certain other civil cases); see also Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 410 (citing 
Michel, supra). 
 40 See Gambrell, supra note 37, at 139 (noting the “fear” that the CAFC will encroach imper-
missibly upon antitrust law); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 410 (citing Gambrell, supra note 37). 
 41 See PAT LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT 
CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 5 tbl.1 (2005) (providing data on “case weights for civil case types”).  
 42 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent 
Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (noting that the CAFC had a “positive and significant 
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Kimberly A. Moore, who was later appointed to the CAFC, concluded that 
forum shopping is a continuing problem within the top ten district court 
jurisdictions that heard almost half of all patent cases between 1995 and 
1999.43 In particular, she found that litigants chose districts based on favor-
able procedural or substantive law.44 Other scholars complain that the 
CAFC does not accurately transmit precedent for lower courts to follow 
because it does not always make the full reasoning of its opinions known.45 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss offers a more positive assessment of the CAFC, 
concluding that it contributes greatly to the “precision and accuracy of pa-
tent law.”46 
Some scholars also argue that decision making at the trial court level 
changed after the CAFC’s formation.47 Using data from 1989 to 1996, John 
R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley concluded that decisions on validity favor-
able to patentees is slightly higher after the CAFC came into being.48 Glynn 
S. Lunney’s study echoes these results; he found that the percent of patents 
held invalid decreased from 50% before the CAFC’s formation to about 
25% in the period 1994–1995.49 Scott E. Atkinson et al. also examined the 
                                                                                                                           
impact on the number of patent applications, the number of patents issued, the success rate of 
patent applications, the amount of patent litigation, and, possibly, the level of research and devel-
opment expenditures”); Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2004) (arguing that 
the CAFC helped achieve uniformity, certainty, and clarity within patent law); Nard & Duffy, 
supra note 37, at 1620–21 (arguing that the CAFC is constrained by its own “isolated and sterile 
jurisprudence”); Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 545 (2003) (“By most accounts, the [legislation that created 
the CAFC] seems to have achieved its purposes. The [CAFC] has clarified many aspects of patent 
law and made it more coherent as a whole.”). 
 43 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 558, 571 (2001) (analyzing “whether patent 
cases are equally dispersed”). 
 44 Id. at 574–85. 
 45 See, e.g., Erica U. Bodwell, Note, Published and Unpublished Federal Circuit Patent Deci-
sions: A Comparison, 30 IDEA 233, 233, 235 (1990) (noting that the CAFC often does not pub-
lish its decision when it affirms the district court); Michel, supra note 39, at 1186–87 (criticizing 
the lack of precedential value of a substantial portion of the CAFC’s cases). 
 46 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989). 
 47 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent 
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV. 745, 754 (2000) (finding a slight increase in validity findings 
post-CAFC creation); Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uni-
formity, Forum Shopping and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 412 (2009) (finding a 
decrease in non-uniformity in the post-CAFC universe of cases); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-
Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 371–72, 371 fig.1 (2001) (finding an 
overall decrease in the rate of patent invalidity after the implementation of the CAFC). 
 48 Allison & Lemley, supra note 47, at 754. 
 49 Lunney, Jr., supra note 47, at 371–72, 371 fig.1. 
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rate at which trial courts mark patents not invalid and found less variability 
across districts after the creation of the CAFC.50 
B. Call for More Expertise 
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars shifted attention to explore whether 
the CAFC’s experiment of specialized decision making should be translated 
to the lower trial courts with the twin aims of bringing uniformity to patent 
law and encouraging greater innovation and growth by protecting patent 
rights.51 Despite the CAFC’s emergence, problems remained with the sys-
tem. In particular, compared to other areas of law where only 10% of cases 
are appealed, litigants appeal half (50%) of patent cases to the CAFC.52 One 
predominant concern is the high rate at which the CAFC reverses lower 
court decisions, particularly on claim construction—one of the most im-
portant areas in patent law.53 Scholars also express skepticism that lay juries 
can reliably decide patent cases.54 As Judge Moore uncovered, patent juries 
are more likely than district court judges to find for the alleged infringer in 
deciding infringement, validity, and damages cases, though the different 
outcomes between jury and bench trials are less apparent than expected.55 
Further, juries tend to decide cases on an “all-or-nothing basis” compared to 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Atkinson et al., supra note 47, at 412. 
 51 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
411–12 (considering whether specialization is more effective at the trial court level than in the 
appellate courts); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 395 (discussing proposals for specialization 
throughout the patent law system); Michel, supra note 39, at 1191–92 (describing the structural 
pitfalls that exist between the district courts and the CAFC); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a 
U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 765, 775 (2000) [hereinafter Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?] (arguing for 
specialization akin to the British system to support innovation); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers 
for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 112–13 (1995) (advocating for trial court specializa-
tion). See generally 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (discussing the aims of the pilot program in the district 
courts). 
 52 Michel, supra note 39, at 1193. 
 53 See, e.g., id. at 1191–92, 1195–96 (offering multi-faceted criticisms of the current system); 
David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Compar-
ing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Courting Specialization] (de-
scribing responses to the high reversal rate). 
 54 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 22, at 3 & nn.5–6 (comparing the shortcomings of judges and 
juries in patent law cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases—An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 408–09 (2000) (comparing outcomes of cases 
decided by judges and juries); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on 
Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 879–80 (2002) (addressing benefits of specialized juries). 
 55 Moore, supra note 54, at 408. Judge Moore found no difference with respect to enforceabil-
ity findings and discovered that there were no statistically significant differences between judges 
and lay juries on appeal. Id. at 408–09. The latter finding, she notes, however, could be due to the 
deferential standard of appellate review. Id. at 409. 
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judges, who may decide each issue separately, ruling for both the patentee 
and the competitor.56 
Concerns about accuracy became especially acute after the United 
States Supreme Court decision in 1996 in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., the seminal case in which the Court ruled that trial courts must 
review the patent claims as a matter of law and appellate courts must apply 
a de novo standard of review on appeal.57 In a “Markman hearing,” judges 
decide the scope of the claims at issue, hearing from experts and the parties 
on how narrow or wide a given claim should be interpreted.58 How the 
claims are construed forms the basis for any subsequent infringement or 
validity analysis.59 Indeed, in some cases, the parties even stipulate to in-
fringement or non-infringement on the basis of the claim construction, thus 
underscoring how important this pre-trial proceeding is to the case outcome 
in patent cases.60 
Scholars find varying evidence that district courts reliably construe pa-
tent claims.61 Because district courts receive no deference on their claim 
constructions, there is some level of unpredictability.62 Analyzing cases 
from 1996 to 2000, during the first years of Markman hearings in district 
courts, Judge Moore found that district courts interpret the claims wrongly 
33% of the time, resulting in cases being either vacated or reversed 81% of 
the time.63 This high rate of reversal contrasts with the 10% rate of reversal 
in non-patent law appeals.64 Similarly, in his study of the slightly later peri-
od between 1998 and 2000, Christian A. Chu discovered that almost a ma-
jority (44%) of claim constructions were modified on appeal.65 David L. 
Schwartz’s 2008 study also found that about 40% of cases included a claim 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See id. at 409 (summarizing the differences in decisions rendered by juries and judges). 
 57 See 517 U.S. at 372, 390, 391 (assigning claim construction to the court and framing the 
role of the CAFC in reviewing those decisions); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 
F.3d 1448, 1451, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (inferring that de novo review is the proper standard based 
on the Supreme Court’s preservation of the CAFC’s appellate decision in Markman). 
 58 See Andrew T. Zindel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study 
Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 712 
& nn.6–7 (2003) (describing the Markman hearing). 
 59 Id. at 712. 
 60 See id. at 728–29, 729 n.150 (considering the impact of Markman hearings on litigation 
decisions). 
 61 See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (analyzing reversal rates over time); Moore, 
supra note 22, at 3 (noting high error rate); Zindel, supra note 58, at 713 (noting persistently high 
reversal rate). 
 62 Moore, supra note 22, at 27–28. 
 63 Id. at 2. 
 64 F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., PILOT PROGRAMS FOR PATENT JUDGES, H.R. REP. NO. 
109-673, at 5 (2006). 
 65 Chu, supra note 61, at 1104.  
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construction that was wrong, at least in part.66 As Jay P. Kesan and Gwen-
dolyn G. Ball argue, combined with the fact that claim construction deci-
sions are reviewed de novo on appeal, this “high rate of both claim con-
struction modifications and claim construction-based reversals in CAFC 
decisions may be unraveling many of the gains in predictability and uni-
formity resulting from the creation of the CAFC.”67 Although some scholars 
contend that claim construction is no different than other issues in inspiring 
difference, the high rate of reversal on claim construction calls into question 
whether specialized expertise can create greater predictability and accura-
cy.68 
C. De Facto Specialization in Trial Courts 
Even prior to the onset of the pilot program, district courts have de fac-
to specialized in the years since the emergence of the CAFC.69 In her study 
of close to ten thousand cases terminated between 1995 and 1999, Judge 
Moore found that patent litigation is geographically concentrated, with the 
top five districts accounting for almost a third of patent cases, with the next 
five districts accounting for an additional 15% of the total.70 A later study 
confirmed these results.71 In an analysis of trial courts’ decisions from 1995 
through 2003, Kesan and Ball uncovered that the top ten district courts 
heard over half of all the nations’ patent law cases, and that the following 
ten district courts heard almost another third.72 The rest of the districts, al-
                                                                                                                           
 66 David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 248 (2008) [hereinafter Schwartz, Prac-
tice Makes Perfect?]. 
 67 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 416; see also Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d. at 1451 (providing the 
scope of de novo review); Chu, supra note 61, at 1143 (recognizing “an increase in claim con-
struction modifications and claim interpretation-based reversals since Cybor Corp.”). These dif-
ferences in claim construction may be compounded by the fact that the CAFC does not speak in a 
single voice on claim construction. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Cir-
cuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 
1111–12 (2004) (arguing that the CAFC is divided into “two distinct methodological approaches” 
for interpreting claims). 
 68 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Inter-
pretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J., 1025, 1092, 1094 (2007) (arguing that “claim 
construction has been no less determinate than another interpretive regime, that of contract inter-
pretation” but also considering the positive impact of specialization at the district court level). 
 69 See Moore, supra note 43, at 561 (noting that specialization occurs due to the forum selec-
tion choices made by litigants). 
 70 Id. at 571. 
 71 See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 421–23, 421 n.175 (discussing results of their study). 
 72 See id. at 421. 
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most 80%, heard only 20% of patent cases filed.73 Likewise, a select group 
of judges ruled on most patent cases, with the top 20% of judges hearing 
almost two-thirds of all patent cases in the United States and 40% of judges 
hearing only one patent case over the entire eight-year period.74 Yet, despite 
the high concentration of cases before only a few judges, Kesan and Ball 
found that among the judges who heard 80% of the patent cases in the entire 
period under study, they each heard, on average, only eleven cases.75 In 
turn, judges with fewer than twenty cases on their docket oversaw slightly 
less than a majority (40%) of cases, with 16% of the cases being heard by 
judges with fewer than ten total patent cases.76 
Litigants favor certain districts for their reputation and efficiency.77 
Notably, in recent years patentees alleging infringement are filing cases 
with increasing frequency in the Eastern District of Texas.78 The forum is 
perceived as having plaintiff-friendly rules and pro-patentee juries, which 
resulted in patentee win rates of 90% in jury trials between 1998 and 2006 
compared to the national average of 68%.79 Some believe that Texas juries 
view property rights differently while also having “a great respect for the 
government and a general distrust of large corporations.”80 Local rules in 
Texas also shorten the discovery period to nine months, making it quicker to 
resolve cases.81 Moreover, judges strictly enforce deadlines and rarely grant 
extensions in an attempt to “clear the docket.”82 
Indeed, some scholars argue that judicial practice in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas has “institutionalized” a pro-patentee bias.83 Dan Klerman and 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. The districts comprising the top third of cases adjusted each year as some districts 
moved in and out of the top groups. Id. For example, the Eastern District of Virginia made the top 
ten in two years between 1995 and 2003 but not in the others. Id. at 421 n.175. 
 74 Id. at 422. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. at 423. By contrast, CAFC judges review about forty patent cases per year. Id. 
 77 See, e.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 206, 209–10 (2007) (describing the reputational value and efficiency of 
the Eastern District of Texas that has made it popular with patentees). 
 78 Id. at 205 (finding that the number of cases in the Eastern District of Texas doubled be-
tween 2004–2006). 
 79 Id. at 206, 210–11. Additionally, the Eastern District of Texas hears few criminal cases, 
clearing the way for patent cases to have greater priority. Id. at 209. Moreover, changes in Texas 
law limited damages in malpractice cases, resulting in a proportionate decline in medical malprac-
tice cases being filed in Texas federal trial courts and thus easing congestion in the courts. Id. at 
209–10. 
 80 Id. at 213 & nn.91–94. 
 81 Id. at 209. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See, e.g., Dan Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243, 253 & 
nn.47–48 (2016) (describing institutional practices of the Eastern District of Texas that result in a 
favorable outcome for patentees). 
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Greg Reilly argue that judges in the Eastern District of Texas actually have 
affirmatively targeted patentee-plaintiffs to file more cases by “distort[ing]” 
common rules concerning how cases are assigned, joined or transferred, 
how discovery is conducted, and the standards for summary judgment.84 For 
instance, judges in the Eastern District of Texas rarely grant summary 
judgment motions, thus placing more cases before patentee-friendly juries.85 
Finding patents invalid is also rare; it took eighteen years before the first 
jury in the Eastern District of Texas found a patent claim invalid.86 The fac-
tors that make the Eastern District of Texas attractive to patentees, however, 
also make it attractive to “patent trolls,” which are holding companies that 
do not practice the invention themselves and that are set up primarily to li-
cense patents.87 Cases filed by these non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) are 
more common than ever, particularly in the Eastern District of Texas.88 
 Additionally, district courts have self-segregated and developed differ-
ent reputations for speed and expertise in certain technologies.89 Some dis-
trict courts, such as the Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District 
of California, have local rules that are designed to allow for “more effi-
cient” management of patent cases.90 The Eastern District of Virginia is 
commonly referred to as the “rocket docket” due to its reputation for speed-
iness.91 Trials are more common in the District of Delaware, where nearly a 
quarter of patent cases proceed to trial.92 By contrast, cases filed in the Cen-
tral and Northern Districts of California tend to have earlier resolutions.93 
District courts also have developed de facto reputations for expertise in cer-
tain fields.94 Many pharmaceutical cases are filed in the District of New Jer-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. at 243. 
 85 See id. at 251, 252 & tbl.2 (comparing the rate of summary judgment in prolific patent 
districts and the impact of summary judgment on case outcomes). Additionally, judges in the 
Eastern District of Texas avoid granting transfer motions, thus contributing to an environment 
where defendants may be forced to settle. Id. at 260–61, 262–63. 
 86 See Leychkis, supra note 77, at 211. 
 87 Id. at 213, 214. 
 88 See id. (“The combination of the local juries’ respect for personal property rights and gov-
ernment agencies and their distrust of large corporate defendants makes the Eastern District of 
Texas an ideal venue for ‘patent trolls.’”); see also MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICI-
ARY CTR., PATENT PILOT PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT 29 (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/content/
316142/patent-pilot-program-five-year-report [https://perma.cc/W7BZ-5WGA] (defining non-prac-
ticing entities (“NPE”)). 
 89 See, e.g., Leychkis, supra note 77, at 209 (describing the efficiency of certain districts’ rule 
regimes). 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. at 210. 
 92 Id. at 202; Moore, supra note 43, at 578 tbl.5. 
 93 Leychkis, supra note 77, at 203; Moore, supra note 43, at 578 tbl.5. 
 94 See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 9 n.14 (describing trends in the District of 
New Jersey); Moore, supra note 43, at 572 (hypothesizing trends in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia). 
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sey, which is home to several of the largest pharmaceutical companies who 
often file Abbreviated New Drug Applications.95 Similarly, many computer 
and software cases are filed in the Northern District of California, the home 
of Silicon Valley.96 These differences have led patentee-win rates to vary 
among the districts; although patentees win over two-thirds of the time in 
the Northern District of California, they prevail less than half the time in 
Delaware and in the Northern District of Illinois.97 The trend toward de fac-
to specialization in the district courts combined with the high rate of rever-
sal at the CAFC are causing alarm among the patent bar.98  
II. SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON SPECIALIZED COURTS 
 Does the system foster too much opportunity to forum shop? Does the 
lack of specialization at the trial court level prevent the CAFC from accom-
plishing its purpose of setting uniform patent law? This Part addresses these 
questions.99 
A. Arguments For and Against Specialized Trial Courts 
In recent years, advocates of patent reform have increasingly be-
moaned the rampant forum shopping in patent law and that patent decisions 
are disproportionately appealed relative to other areas of law.100 Across all 
appellate courts, civil cases are appealed about 10% of the time, yet in pa-
tent law, appeals are filed in nearly 50% of cases.101 An experienced trial 
court, some argue, is needed even more than a specialized appellate court as 
the former dispose of cases in a more efficient manner and with greater ac-
curacy.102 Because trial courts deal mainly with facts, they can leverage 
                                                                                                                           
 95 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 9 n.14. 
 96 See Moore, supra note 43, at 572 (considering influences on the high rate of cases in the 
Northern District of California). 
 97 See Leychkis, supra note 77, at 203 (comparing patentee win rates in various districts). 
 98 See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 416 (highlighting concerns with reversal rates); Moore, 
supra note 43, at 560 n.5 (considering concerns with forum shopping). 
 99 See infra notes 100–161 and accompanying text. 
 100 See, e.g., Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 242 (offering reasons for why forum shop-
ping is harmful to litigation); Michel, supra note 39, at 1193 (comparing appeal rates for federal 
civil cases). 
 101 Michel, supra note 39, at 1193. 
 102 See id. (discussing the disproportionate rate of appeals of patent cases from the trial courts 
compared to the rate of appeals of civil cases); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1446–47, 1472 & n.173 (2010) (arguing for changing venue rules to en-
courage specialization among district court judges); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 402–03 (sup-
porting specialization at the trial court level); Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court?, supra 
note 51, at 767 (2000) (arguing for specialization in the U.S. Court of International Trade 
(“CIT”)); Gregory J. Wallace, Note, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement 
Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of 
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their expertise on technical matters to better understand how to apply patent 
law.103 
As Kesan and Ball contend, there are four arguments as to why courts 
may want to specialize: (1) “the development of judicial human capital;” 
(2) to foster uniformity and consistent precedent; (3) the impact specializa-
tion has on the “political economy of the legal system”; and (4) to increase 
the efficiency of the trial courts.104 The argument for court specialization is 
especially strong with respect to complex matters like patent litigation.105 
As Dreyfuss notes, “[t]he more intricate the law, the more likely it is that a 
generalist will get things wrong, confuse matters, and encourage additional 
litigation.”106 Specialist courts are likely better able to gauge the nuances 
behind bright line rules.107 They may also, by extension, devise precedent 
that is uniform and consistent across time and fact patterns.108 The need for 
a specialized forum is especially felt when the cases address a subject mat-
ter of national concern, the Supreme Court rarely provides oversight, and 
the availability of forum shopping encourages “parties [to] game the sys-
tem”—all attributes of the modern patent system.109 Moreover, specialized 
judges might act less ideologically and be less inclined to rule in line with 
“ideological fads” than non-specialized judges.110 Specialized judges decide 
cases faster as they do not need to take the time to get up to speed with ar-
cane areas of law.111 Specialization can also combat forum shopping by en-
couraging consistency and reducing administrative costs.112 
                                                                                                                           
Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2004) (proposing reform through specializa-
tion of trial courts). 
 103 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1476 
(2012) (arguing that trial court judges, as opposed to the CAFC judges, can more easily specialize 
in the “complexity of the technology underlying” patent law cases); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts 
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 
1065 (2003) (considering the impact of inaccurate factual determinations by the CAFC); Rai, 
supra note 54, at 878–81 (discussing the pitfalls of factual determinations by the CAFC and the 
arguments for specialized trial courts). 
 104 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 400–01. 
 105 See id. at 414 (supporting trial court specialization). 
 106 Dreyfuss, supra note 51, at 409. 
 107 Id. at 378. 
 108 See id. (encouraging specialization to create “single voice” and “[g]reater consistency in 
court opinions”); Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 402 (“A specialized court that allows judges to 
gain an in-depth understanding of existing law may promote uniformity and predictability across 
jurisdictions . . . .”). 
 109 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 403–04. 
 110 See Stempel, supra note 51, at 104 (describing the ideological influences that plague gen-
eralist judges). 
 111 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 408. 
 112 Id. at 408; see also Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 
More Than a National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 46 (1984) (discussing similar benefits of 
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Specialized trial courts have their disadvantages.113 Generalist judges 
may be more adept at linking patent law with other legal quagmires.114 Most 
of the judges on the CAFC, a specialized court with limited jurisdiction, do 
not have science backgrounds.115 So “many distinguished opinions” in pa-
tent law have been written by generalist appellate judges—some with min-
imal technical training or experience in patent law.116 Further, like most civ-
il cases, many patent cases concern routine procedural matters, like jurisdic-
tion or standing, or concern areas of law like contract interpretation, anti-
trust, libel, or state-law trade secret claims—issues on which a specialized 
patent trial court offers no special insight.117 In turn, the lack of diversity of 
cases in specialized courts could lead to “tunnel vision,” stagnating the de-
velopment of precedent consistent with changing times.118 Specialized 
judges, especially those located within administrative agencies, may be sub-
ject to capture by the very interest they oversee.119 In particular, a special-
ized court like the CAFC could be biased toward the federal government 
and thus more likely rule that the USPTO committed no error and that the 
patent is valid.120 The judicial appointment process for specialized judges 
may also be more partisan as special interests clamor to get their favored 
                                                                                                                           
specialized appellate courts). The costs of litigation can be lessened with “more efficient admin-
istration.” Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 409. 
 113 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 409. 
 114 Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1123; Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not 
the Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (2005). 
See generally Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized 
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951) (arguing strongly, from the perspective of a federal district 
judge, against the creation of a specialized patent court). 
 115 See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 400 (defining the CAFC); Rai, supra note 103, at 1068 
& n.148 (reflecting on the expertise of judges on the CAFC). 
 116 See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 24–25, 25 n.152 (describing the backgrounds of key CAFC 
patent law judges). 
 117 See Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 748 (1981) 
(noting the boundary issues raised by specialized courts); Rifkind, supra note 114, at 426 (reflect-
ing on the undesirability of a specialized patent court). 
 118 See Dreyfuss, supra note 51, at 381 (considering the downsides of a specialized court); 
Fromer, supra note 102, at 1472 (reviewing critiques of specialized trial courts). 
 119 See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts to 
Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 224 (1991) (noting that specialized courts represent 
“the efforts of interest groups to secure advantages for themselves”); Richard A. Posner, Will the 
Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the 
Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 785 (1983) (“Specialists are more likely than general-
ists to identify with the goals of a government program . . . .”). 
 120 See Gugliuzza, supra note 103, at 1449, 1466 (discussing drawbacks to specialization and 
potential bias); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1965, 1970, 1971 (2009) (positing that the USPTO has had increasing influence on the 
CAFC as the latter has become more pro-patentee). 
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candidate appointed.121 As a result of partisan influences, specialized judges 
might be more ideological or less qualified than non-specialists, thus lend-
ing less stability to decision making in general.122 Further, specialization 
may lead to increased error if appellate courts defer more often to special-
ized expertise at the trial court level.123 Specialized judges may be less like-
ly to set forth their reasoning in clear, well-reasoned decisions if the uni-
verse of judicial decision makers is small and specialized.124 
B. Empirical Studies of Specialized Patent Trial Courts 
Several scholars have examined whether judicial expertise impacts tri-
al court decision making in patent law by simply analyzing, in a non-
statistical fashion, the appellate courts’ reversal rate of patent decisions to 
uncover patterns.125 Donna M. Gitter argued that reversal rates of claim 
construction are lower in England than in the United States because Eng-
land hears cases through a specialized patent tribunal.126 Similarly, 
Schwartz looked at how reversals vary depending on judicial experience but 
found it of little relevance.127 Specifically, Schwartz contends that claim 
construction reversal rates do not decrease with an increase in the number 
of cases appealed to the CAFC or with more experience overall in patent 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Andrew P. Morriss, Comment, A Public Choice Perspective on the Federal Circuit, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 811, 816 (2004) (“[W]e would expect the repeat players concerned with 
[specialized issues] to invest in the judicial selection process to gain appointments of candidates 
they thought would favor their position.”); see also Posner, supra note 119, at 784 (noting that “an 
independent judiciary will tend on balance to reduce the scope of special interest politics in Amer-
ican life and . . . a generalist judiciary will be more independent than a specialist one”). 
 122 Posner, supra note 119, at 781; see Jordan, supra note 117, at 748 (discussing how special-
ized federal judgeships can be seen “as inferior” to generalist positions, affecting “the quality of 
decisions”); see also Damle, supra note 114, at 1285–86 (citing Jordan, supra note 117). 
 123 See Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1128 (discussing concerns with specialized trial courts, 
especially in patent law); Moore supra note 22, at 29 (weighing the pros and cons of increased 
deference). 
 124 See Rifkind, supra note 114, at 426 (fearing that a specialized patent law system would 
become hyper-exclusive, resulting in “unintelligible” legal doctrine). 
 125 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial 
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of 
Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 185–86 (2009) (arguing that increasing 
the expertise of U.S. district court judges would lower reversal rates at the CAFC based on the 
specialized English model); Moore, supra note 22, at 29 (finding reversal rates do not improve 
with de novo review of claim construction); Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53, at 
1702 (finding reversal rates are not correlated to judicial experience with patent law cases). See 
generally Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 418 (discussing the claim construction-focused studies by 
Gitter, supra, Olson, infra note 132, and Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53). 
 126 Gitter, supra note 125, at 183, 185–86. 
 127 Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53, at 1702; Schwartz, Practice Makes 
Perfect?, supra note 66, at 255–56, 255 fig.5. 
536 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:519 
litigation or with experience on the bench.128 Indeed, he found that judges 
have the highest reversals rate if they had multiple claim construction ap-
peals.129 In his 2009 study, Schwartz analyzed whether specialized judges at 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) are less likely to be 
reversed on appeal than district court judges.130 He found that administra-
tive law judges at the USITC are not more accurate than generalist judges, 
at least in terms of claim construction.131 In another study, Nancy Olson 
discerned no difference in claim construction rulings across varying tiers of 
judicial experience.132 In her data, Judge Moore also failed to see an in-
crease in affirmance rates over time.133 These studies, however, concern 
only one issue on appeal—claim construction—and were never designed to 
be robust statistical tests of the impact of judicial specialization on appellate 
reversal, partly because these analyses do not control for other variables that 
could impact results.134 
Other scholars argue that specialization has reduced reversal rates, 
though their studies are not designed to cover identical ground as the 
aforementioned scholarship and do not employ robust statistical tech-
niques.135 Looking at CAFC cases filed during the two-year period between 
1998 and 2000, Christian A. Chu contends that “more active” district courts, 
defined as those where the CAFC heard more than ten cases, had lower re-
versal rates compared to “less active” districts, though his results lack statis-
tical significance and are more descriptive than quantitative.136 His analysis 
also omits Federal Circuit Rule 36 (“Rule 36”) opinions on summary affir-
                                                                                                                           
 128 Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 252, 256. 
 129 Id. at 252. 
 130 Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 53, at 1703. 
 131 Id. at 1704. 
 132 Nancy Olson, Comment, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s 
Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. REV. 745, 774–75, 779 (2008). 
 133 Moore, supra note 22, at 29 (“[A]ffirmance rates have not improved substantially over the 
five years since Markman.”). 
 134 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 418–19. 
 135 See, e.g., Chu, supra note 61, at 1122–23 (comparing districts based on the number of 
patent appeals they send to the CAFC); Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228, 233 (finding greater expe-
rience correlates with lower reversal rates). 
 136 Chu, supra note 61, at 1092, 1122–23. Chu counts among the “more active” districts the 
following: the Central District of California, the District of Delaware, the District of Massachu-
setts, the District of Minnesota, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Michigan, the 
Eastern District of Virginia, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Illinois, 
the Southern District of Florida, and the Southern District of New York. Id. at 1122. He also in-
cludes appeals from the former Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Court of Federal 
Claims, and the USITC in the “more active” category. Id. Chu examines cases where the CAFC 
expressly reviews the lower tribunal’s claim construction. See id. at 1092, 1100 & n.121 (limiting 
the study to written decisions issued by the CAFC on “all patent issues, including infringement, 
validity[,] and inequitable conduct” but also analyzing claim construction on its own). He, there-
fore, excludes Rule 36 judgments. Id. at 1100 n.121. 
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mances, which biases the results toward showing higher claim construction 
reversal rates.137 In analyzing cases preemptively in 2009 to consider 
whether Congress’s proposed pilot program would reduce reversals, Adam 
Shartzer concluded that when looking at all patent cases—not just claim 
construction cases—judges’ increased experience with patent litigation re-
sulted in higher affirmance rates on appeal.138 He found that although the 
reversal rate for all judges was about 15%, judges eligible for the pilot pro-
gram would have a reversal rate of approximately 11%.139 Because 
Shartzer’s analysis pre-dates the pilot program, however, he could not make 
any comparative statement about how non-pilot judges fared compared to 
pilot judges.140 
Scholars Banks Miller and Brett Curry found a relationship between 
judges’ political ideologies and their specialization when making obvious-
ness determinations.141 They argue successfully that judges with more tech-
nical scientific experience are more likely than non-specialists to consider 
patent cases “salient,” thus magnifying the influence of ideology on vote 
choice for “expert” judges.142 Miller and Curry, also conclude, however, that 
experience at the CAFC has no effect on decision making for obviousness 
determinations.143 
More recently, Kesan and Ball expanded on these studies with a robust 
statistical analysis of how experience influences both the speed with which 
a trial court decides a patent case and the proclivity of the CAFC to over-
turn the case on appeal.144 They found that judges with greater experience 
heard cases faster, thereby impacting the accuracy of decision making in 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See id. at 1102 (finding an increase in reversal rates for claim construction); Schwartz, 
Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 235 (summarizing and expanding upon Judge Moore’s 
criticism of Chu’s results for failing to include the CAFC’s affirmative Rule 36 case construction 
rulings). 
 138 Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228. 
 139 Id. at 227–28, 233. 
 140 Id. at 233. 
 141 See Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 857 (finding that Clinton-appointed CAFC judges 
who are considered experts will invalidate patents on obviousness grounds at a rate of 55% com-
pared to 25% for Reagan-nominated expert appointees). Miller and Curry defined “patent experts 
[as] those individuals who possessed technical degrees . . . and who were also members of the 
patent bar.” Id. at 851 n.15. They find that ideology has no statistically significant impact on the 
decisions of ideologically opposed non-expert judges. Id. at 857. Political scientists have long 
theorized that individuals with greater knowledge or expertise have greater levels of ideological 
constraint. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems Among Mass Publics, in 
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 206, 246–49 (David E. Apter ed., 1964) (confirming his hy-
pothesis that those possessing greater political knowledge have more ideologically consistent 
opinions). 
 142 See Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 840. 
 143 Id. at 857. 
 144 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 420. 
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terms of whether the CAFC totally or partially reverses the trial court on 
appeal.145 Their results applied not only to claim construction issues but also 
to other areas of patent law, including validity, infringement, inequitable 
conduct, damages, and preliminary injunction determinations.146 Although 
they found that general experience in terms of years on the bench does not 
affect the results, they discovered that specialized patent law experience 
reduced the chance of the judgment being overturned on appeal in full and 
in part on non-claim construction infringement cases as well as when the 
CAFC had to decide cases emanating from preliminary injunctions or 
judgment as a matter of law.147 Indeed, they found a 60% spread between 
experienced and unexperienced judges in terms of whether the CAFC over-
turned an infringement ruling.148 
Additionally, Mark A. Lemley et al. found that more experienced pa-
tent judges were less inclined to decide in favor of the patentee in infringe-
ment cases.149 By contrast, they found experience to be inconsequential 
when ruling on validity.150 This experience effect, however, was weak; only 
judges who rarely heard patent cases (defined as less than one final ruling 
per three-year period) were more likely to rule in favor of the patentee.151 
These results, Lemley et al. contend, rebut the conventional wisdom that 
plaintiff forum shopping is driven in part by a perception that some district 
courts are friendlier to certain kinds of parties.152 Although they found that 
patentees holding patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical fields 
were among the most likely patentees to prevail, they did not uncover sup-
port for the popular perception that plaintiffs have an easier time of winning 
in the Eastern District of Texas.153 Lemley et al. concluded that judges with 
more experience differ in their outcomes, but whether such a result is desir-
able is a matter of perspective.154 They postulate several reasons for the re-
sults, contending that the effect could be due to evolutions in attitude, more 
familiarity with patent law that leads to greater confidence in one’s rulings, 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 420, 432. 
 147 Id. at 439. 
 148 Id. Specifically, they found that the probability of an infringement ruling being overruled 
for a judge of low patent experience was 45% compared to a 15% probability of a highly-
experienced judge’s ruling being overturned. Id. 
 149 Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1151 (arguing that “[f]amiliarity . . . breeds contempt”). 
 150 Id.  
 151 Id. at 1143 (“Even a modest volume of patent cases . . . is enough to drive a significantly 
higher rate of non[-]infringement findings. Once a judge has even a modest volume of patent cas-
es, the effect levels off and further specialization does not appear to affect outcomes.”). 
 152 See id. at 1124–25, 1139–40 (countering prevalent forum shopping theories with evidence 
that patentees are better off in front of judges who have little to no experience with patent cases). 
 153 Id. at 1125, 1139. 
 154 Id. at 1151–52. 
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or simply more exposure to the unique procedures incident to patent law.155 
A judge less versed in patent law may not feel as comfortable ruling on 
summary judgment, for instance.156 Additionally, more experienced judges 
may feel that patentees “overclaim” their inventions and thus grow more 
skeptical once they see patentee after patentee claiming a broad inven-
tion.157 Given that, Lemley et al. argue that accused infringers as opposed to 
patentees would benefit most from a specialized patent trial court.158 
More recently, Mark A. Lemley and Shawn P. Miller analyzed judicial 
factors that impact reversal rates.159 Accounting for judicial tenure, they 
found that personal relationships between CAFC and district court judges 
impacted reversal rates in claim construction cases, noting that district court 
judges who previously sat by designation on the CAFC have reduced rever-
sal rates.160 They concluded that this result was not a function of experience 
but rather “reflects a personal connection between [district] judge and the 
members of the reviewing court.”161 
III. REVIEWING THE PATENT LAW PILOT PROGRAM 
A. Description of the Patent Pilot Program 
First introduced in 2007 by U.S. Representative Darrell Issa of Cali-
fornia, the patent pilot program is designed to foster greater specialization 
within the federal patent judiciary at the district court level.162 Appropriated 
for five million dollars, the program intends to mitigate some of the prob-
lems inherent in patent litigation, such as “the high cost of patent litigation, 
forum shopping, and high reversal rates on appeal” to the CAFC.163 The 
legislative history implies that it was the hope of the pilot’s sponsors that 
increased expertise would lead to lower reversal rates.164 The bill’s sponsors 
argued that the high rate of overturned district court decisions was due to 
“judicial inexperience and misunderstanding of patent law.”165 Any district 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 1151. 
 157 Id. at 1151–52. 
 158 Id. at 1125. 
 159 Mark A. Lemley & Shawn P. Miller, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em? How Sitting by 
Designation Affects Judicial Behavior, 94 TEX. L. REV. 451, 457 (2016). 
 160 Id. at 452. 
 161 Id. at 453. 
 162 Shartzer, supra note 29, at 192. 
 163 Id. at 192 & n.6. 
 164 Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(e)(1), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675–76 (2011); see 
also 156 CONG. REC. H8537 (2010) (“The premise underlying H.R. 628 is, succinctly stated, 
practice makes perfect, or at least better. Judges who focus more attention on patent cases will be 
expected to be better prepared to make decisions that can withstand appellate scrutiny.”). 
 165 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007). 
540 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:519 
court within the top fifteen district courts having the greatest number of pa-
tent cases in 2010 could participate in the program, with district courts that 
opted in having at least three judges in their district designated as patent 
judges.166 If a non-designated generalist judge receives a patent law case 
within the confines of the district court’s normal random allocation of cases, 
the district court may then randomly reassign the case to a patent judge 
within the district participating in the program.167 To discourage forum 
shopping, the legislation requires that at least six districts in three circuits 
participate.168 Only districts with at least ten judgeships were eligible initial-
ly, thus leaving out popular patent forums such as the District of Delaware 
and the Eastern District of Texas.169 This provision was subsequently altered 
to allow these districts to participate.170 The program’s funding allows judg-
es to hire scientifically-trained law clerks and to provide training for judges 
who decide to participate in the pilot.171 Participants in the program remain 
free to take on cases of other subject matters as their schedule allows.172 The 
program is designed to last for ten years and requires that periodic reports 
be made to Congress.173 It went into operation in September 2011.174 Figure 
1 details the district courts participating in the pilot program and Table 1 
displays the number of judges participating in each of the pilot districts at 
the start of the program in September 2011.175 Where the case lists multiple 
judges, the pilot status of the presiding judge in the outcome of the case is 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 3674–75; see also 
H.R. 34, 110th Cong. § 1(a)–(b) (2007) (providing the initial proposal from the House of Repre-
sentatives). 
 167Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(a)(1)(C)(D), (a)(3), 124 Stat. at 3674. 
 168 Id. § 1(b)(1). 
 169 See 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (discussing the parameters of the proposed legislation); 
Shartzer, supra note 29, at 198, 199 n.65 (reviewing the requirements of the patent pilot program). 
 170 See Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(b)(2)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. at 3675 (providing eligibility criteria for 
districts with fewer than ten judges). 
 171 Shartzer, supra note 29, at 199; see also H.R. 34 § 1(f) (outlining the House’s funding 
proposal). 
 172 See 153 CONG. REC. 3715 (2007) (describing the randomized assignment of cases in the 
district courts). Additionally, senior judges may opt in as participants if an active judge also par-
ticipates. Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 3674. 
 173 Act of Jan. 4, 2011 § 1(c), (e), 124 Stat. at 3675–76. 
 174 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 n.5. The program passed the House several times 
with unanimous bipartisan support—a rarity in the existing political climate. Lemley et al., supra 
note 16, at 1129. 
 175 See Ron Vogel, The Patent Pilot Program: Reassignment Rates and the Effect of Local 
Patent Rules, N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N BULL. (N.Y. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, Fort Lee, N.J.), 
Oct.–Nov. 2013, at 13, 17–18 (providing a full list of judges participating in the pilot program). 
Some districts subsequently added judges to the program. See, e.g., General Order Regarding Pilot 
Patent Project, General Order 16-3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/goFiles/16-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JQ-UBKQ] (adding Judge Schroeder to the 
pilot program). 
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used.176 At the program’s inception in 2011, there were eighty-five district 
court judges and sixteen pilot magistrate judges.177 
Figure 1* 
 
  
                                                                                                                           
 176 In some cases, using this measure may be misleading. It is possible that a judge spent 
significant time on a case, then retired, and the case was assigned to a new judge. Some courts 
also periodically transfer cases due to workload. The line needs to be drawn somewhere, however, 
and the judge who presided over the trial or authored the summary judgment motion or other opin-
ion is most likely the one who spent the most time on the case. 
 177 See Steven Gray, The Designated Judges for the New Specialized Patent Pilot Program 
for U.S. Courts, IP BASICS BLOG (Feb. 9, 2012), http://patentmyinvention.blogspot.com/2012/02/
new-specialized-patent-pilot-program.html [https://perma.cc/C483-LZ6M] (listing the pilot judg-
es). 
 * All graphs and tables in this Article are also available online at 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-2/semet-
graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VVD-PU4K]. 
542 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:519 
Table 1: Pilot Program Patent Cases and Judgeships 
(as originally chosen on September 2011) 
District Cases Filed from 
Sept. 2011-Sept. 
2016 
Pilot Program Judge-
ships 
Percent of Dis-
trict’s Judges 
N.D.Cal. 1,122 5 District Judges, 7 
Magistrate Judges 
39% 
S.D.Cal. 
 
616 5 29% 
C.D.Cal. 
 
1.901 6 16% 
D.Nev. 
 
182 4 30% 
E.D.Tex. 
 
7,943 6 71% 
N.D.Tex. 
 
382 3 21% 
N.D.Ill. 1,012 10 26% 
 
S.D.N.Y. 
 
698 
 
10 
 
20% 
 
E.D.N.Y. 179 6 District Judges, 9 
Magistrate Judges 
53% 
D.N.J. 
 
1,030 11 44% 
W.D.Pa. 100 6 38% 
 
D.Md. 149 3 17% 
 
W.D.Tenn. 
 
                   59 
 
2 
 
43% 
 
S.D.Fla.178 699 3 12% 
B. Patent Pilot Program 2016 Update 
The FJC produced a report on the patent pilot program at the five-year 
mark in April 2016.179 Its authors, Margaret S. Williams et al., found that 
24% of district judges hearing at least one patent case (a total of sixty-six 
judges) had participated in the pilot program thus far and that pilot judges 
heard more than 76% of patent cases in the pilot districts.180 This figure var-
ies among districts, with the lowest being 13% in the Eastern District of 
New York and the highest being 33% in the Eastern District of Texas.181 As 
                                                                                                                           
 178 The Southern District of Florida left the pilot program in 2014. Patent Pilot Program in 
Southern District of Florida Scrubbed, ASSOULINE & BERLOWE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://assouline
berlowe.wordpress.com/2014/08/13/patent-pilot-program-in-southern-district-of-florida-scrubbed/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EJA-BWMX]. 
 179 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at v. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 2, 3 tbl.3. 
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a whole, pilot judges have more patent experience than non-pilot judges, 
with judges in the Eastern District of Texas having substantially more patent 
experience than judges in other districts.182 Overall, the authors concluded 
that pilot judges work more expeditiously in terminating cases, with the 
differences in total duration time being statistically significant.183 Control-
ling for the number of transfers and the judge’s experience, the FJC report-
ed that pilot judges terminate cases 8% faster than non-pilot judges.184  
The number of pilot cases also varies by district, with pilot cases com-
prising only 23% of the Northern District of California’s total patent cases, 
but accounting for about 90% of patent cases in the Eastern District of Tex-
as, the Western District of Tennessee, and the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania.185 Despite this variation, Williams et al. found that the rate of appeal 
did not differ between pilot and non-pilot judges, and that most cases—no 
matter who presided over them—resulted in affirmances on appeal.186 The 
study uncovered a great deal of variation among districts in the rates of ap-
peal.187 For instance, as a portion of the overall case docket, appeals from 
the Eastern District of Texas were relatively rare, although there was a larg-
er than expected number of appeals from the three California districts in the 
pilot program and the Southern District of New York.188 Appeals from the 
Eastern District of Texas may have been low because only 1% of cases from 
that district resulted in judgment, with the other aforementioned districts 
having a greater percentage of their cases resulting in final judgment.189 
Regarding the outcome on appeal, although Williams et al. looked only 
at descriptive statistics, they found no statistically significant difference in 
results between pilot and non-pilot judges.190 In all, they concluded that “pi-
lot and non[-]pilot cases are ‘correct’ at approximately the same rate” with 
72% of cases upheld in full by the CAFC on appeal.191 Loosening the defi-
nition of “correct” to include partial affirmances and dismissals, the FJC 
reported that the CAFC affirmed the lower court 91% in pilot cases and 
88% for non-pilot cases, a difference that was not statistically significant.192 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Id. at 5, 6. 
 183 Id. at v, 22. 
 184 Id. at 23. 
 185 Id. at 8. 
 186 Id. at 32, 36. 
 187 See id. at 31–36 (exploring the impact on appeals to the CAFC from district judges). 
 188 Id. at 32, 33. 
 189 Id. at 33. 
 190 Id. at 36. 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. 
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More recently, a forum studying the pilot program in the Northern District 
of Illinois reached similar conclusions about the pilot program.193 
C. Data Collection for the Present Analysis 
Using data from the database Lex Machina, this analysis draws from 
25,223 patent cases filed from September 19, 2011 through September 30, 
2016 with a termination date of December 31, 2018.194 Cases that had pre-
viously been filed prior to the pilot program initiation were then eliminated. 
For instance, a case could have been filed in another district and transferred 
after the September 19 date or the case could have been attached to a previ-
ously filed case.195 Figure 2 shows a map detailing the number of cases filed 
per district. The most popular district, not surprisingly, is the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, with 7,943 cases filed during this period, with the District of 
Delaware trailing in second place with 4,194 filed cases. About a fifth of the 
District of Delaware’s entire docket is allocated to patent cases.196 As Figure 
2 displays, other districts have very few cases filed comparably; for exam-
ple, the District of Alaska has only one. 
Figure 2 
                                                                                                                           
 193 RIPL Volume 17 Executive Board, Comment, Patent Pilot Program Perspectives: Patent 
Litigation in the Northern District of Illinois, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 348, 359 
(2018) [hereinafter Patent Pilot Program Perspectives]. 
 194 See generally LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/ [https://perma.cc/39BP-XG7C] 
(providing legal analytics). 
 195 Lex Machina counts a case multiple times if a case has been transferred either inter-district 
or intra-district. I looked at the docket sheets of the 1,001 inter-district transfer cases and the sixty-
seven intra-district cases filed during this period to ensure appropriately that the case would be 
allocated to the district court where it was filed when discussing filing and where it was ruled on 
when discussing case merits. 
 196 Shartzer, supra note 29, at 237 (noting that about 17% of cases filed in the District of Del-
aware are patent cases). 
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1. Global Differences in Cases in Pilot and Non-Pilot Districts  
Overall, more patent cases are filed or transferred to the pilot districts, 
though certain pilot districts hear few cases. For instance, the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania and the Western District of Tennessee had ninety-six 
and fifty-five cases, respectively, filed during the period under study. As the 
FJC also reports, although the courts transfer some cases to include them in 
the pilot, the average number of transfers is zero.197 A district court internal-
ly transfers cases within a district for many reasons, such as recusal or be-
cause the case is closely connected to another case; some districts also 
transfer cases to other divisions to balance out caseload.198 The FJC reports 
that 72% of transfers are because of the pilot program.199 For the most part, 
as time goes on, few judges kick the case back into the patent pool, though 
the differences vary by district.200 As of 2013, for instance, only about 10% 
of judges in the Southern District of New York were declining an initial pa-
tent assignment.201 According to the database, transfers are more common 
in the Southern District of Florida, the Central District of California, and the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, whereas transfers are less common in the 
Northern District of California and the Southern District of New York, part-
ly due to the fact that a low percentage of judges participate in the pilot in 
the latter districts.202 
Looking at the data by unique plaintiffs asserting different patents, 
some districts are more popular among either repeat plaintiffs filing on the 
same patent (for example, a pharmaceutical company filing multiple in-
fringement cases against generic manufacturers) or so-called “patent trolls” 
filing multiple cases. Controlling for repeat filers, however, the number of 
                                                                                                                           
 197 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 10. 
 198 See id. (discussing various reasons for transferring a case). 
 199 Id. Although there are intra-district transfers because of the pilot program, they are proba-
bly less than what the program’s developers anticipated. See id. 
 200 See, e.g., Robert Gunther & Omar Khan, Patent Pilot Program: One Year Later, N.Y. L.J., 
Jan. 7, 2013, at S6 (describing trends in the pilot program with a focus on the Southern District of 
New York). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Some districts make it easier to tell whether a transfer is actually due to reassignment un-
der the pilot program. The docket sheet for the Western District of Pennsylvania, for instance, 
notes when a judge declines an assignment because of the pilot program, while other districts’ 
docket sheets note the appropriate local rule to signify an intra-district transfer because of the pilot 
program. In other districts, however, it is impossible to tell from the docket sheet why a transfer 
was made. Moreover, sometimes cases are transferred due to cases being related, which may mask 
the true extent to which patent cases are being disproportionately reassigned to pilot judges. The 
docket sheet will note that the transfer is due to the cases being related, even though the first case 
was transferred due to the pilot program. In some districts such as the Western District of Penn-
sylvania or the Central District of California, a large majority of the district’s patent cases are 
heard by pilot judges and are transferred internally, whether by official transfer through the pilot 
program, intradistrict transfer because the cases are related, or transfers to balance out workload. 
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cases in some districts dramatically declines. For instance, using this more 
limited definition of case type limited by patent, there are only about 1,200 
patent cases sharing the same plaintiff and patents asserted filed in the East-
ern District of Texas, a near six-fold decline. This change indicates that the 
district is a popular forum for filing with patent trolls and serial filers.203 
Figure 3 displays a comparison of technology by pilot and non-pilot 
judges. Overall, 69% of cases before pilot judges concern computers and 
communications, compared to just 52% before the non-pilot judges, a figure 
that is statistically significant.204 The spread between technology categories, 
however, equalizes by excluding the Eastern District of Texas, a forum pop-
ular for filing computer cases, from the analysis. In addition, more medical 
and drug cases are filed in the non-pilot districts (14% versus 9%) overall, 
perhaps due to the fact that so many medical and drug cases are filed in the 
District of Delaware, a non-pilot district. Overall, non-pilot judges see more 
chemical, electronics, medical and drug, mechanical, and “other” technolo-
gies as a percent of its docket than do pilot dockets. Non-pilot judges also 
see more unique cases. For instance, an individual patentee not affiliated 
with a corporation may file a patent infringement suit in their local district 
court whereas large corporations with an extensive patent portfolio may file 
in popular patent districts. Looking at the breakdown by pilot districts ver-
sus non-pilot districts, rather than pilot versus non-pilot judges, the percent-
ages are similar, mirroring that of the judge analysis overall.205 
  
                                                                                                                           
 203 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 29–30, 30 tbl.26 (analyzing “serially filed cases,” 
noting that 86% of cases are serially filed in the Eastern District of Texas). 
 204 These trends persist examining the data by eliminating cases with the same plaintiff in-
volving the same patent portfolio. Under those circumstances, 48% of all cases filed before pilot 
judges concern computers and communications compared to 33% before non-pilot judges. Non-
pilot judges also see more cases involving the other categories, though the percent of drug cases is 
about the same, partly because so many pharmaceutical cases are also heard in the District of New 
Jersey as well as the District of Delaware. Some scholars do not conduct significance tests because 
their database, like the present study’s, consists of the entire population of cases under study. See, 
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1095 
(2008) (“[B]ecause our dataset consists of the entire population of cases of interest . . . and not a 
sample of cases from the population, . . . for most issues there is no need to conduct significance 
tests on the basic summary figures . . . .”). In statistics, one can assess whether a difference in two 
sample means is statistically significant by conducting various statistical tests, such as t-tests. The 
present study, however, consists of the full population of cases, not simply a randomly drawn 
sample. Nonetheless, hypothesis testing was conducted using chi-squared analysis to determine 
whether the means of select groups differ from one another and those results are presented where 
applicable. 
 205 It is difficult to tease out the direction of causality; that is, whether certain cases are filed 
deliberately in districts for their technical expertise on a given technology, or whether coinci-
dentally, the geographic concentration of certain industries results in more patent cases of a given 
technological type filed in a given district. 
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Figure 3 
 
Case disposition varies among the districts. Overall, almost 90% of 
cases settle in some way, either by stipulated dismissal (57%) or with the 
plaintiff voluntarily dismissing the case (29%).206 Another 4% of cases get 
resolved by consent judgment, and about 1% of cases are default judg-
ments. Only about 2% of all cases ever filed go to trial (with slightly more 
proceeding to a jury trial as opposed to a bench trial), with about 6% of cas-
es dismissed on motion for substantive or procedural reasons and 2% of 
cases resolved by summary judgment.207 Many of the consent judgment 
cases actually occur after the court issues a claim construction ruling in 
these cases and the parties stipulate to non-infringement or validity of the 
patent based on the claim construction ruling.  
                                                                                                                           
 206 Sometimes parties will voluntarily dismiss a case only to refile the case in another district, 
further complicating the analysis. This occurs most often with parties filing in the Eastern District 
of Texas or the District of Delaware and then abandoning the case only to refile somewhere else. 
In addition, about 2% of cases are procedurally stayed pending review of another case or pending 
review of the patent at the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (“PTAB”). About 1% of cases 
also are subject to multidistrict litigation and 3% are consolidated. A small percentage of cases are 
also subject to severance motions or are transferred inter-district or intra-district. The above per-
centages ignore these procedural postures. 
 207 These figures include all cases, including cases filed by repeat litigants or cases filed by 
the same plaintiff against different defendants. District courts have different rules regarding join-
der so these numbers may vary depending on how one collates the cases under study. See, e.g., 
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 257–59 (noting the unique joinder rules in the Eastern District 
of Texas). 
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As detailed in Figure 4, case disposition is similar between pilot and 
non-pilot judges, although differences between them are statistically signifi-
cant. Pilot judges see more stipulated dismissals (61% v. 54%) as well as 
more consolidated cases.208 Overall, stipulated dismissals and plaintiff vol-
untary dismissals comprise 89% of pilot judge resolutions compared to 84% 
in the non-pilot courts. Moreover, non-pilot judges resolve cases more fre-
quently with dismissal motions (7% v. 3%). Excluding the Eastern District 
of Texas, however, the differences between pilot and non-pilot judges in 
terms of case disposition become less noticeable. Differences between pilot 
and non-pilot judges on the percent of cases resolved by motions to dismiss 
or summary judgment are no longer statistically significant excluding the 
Eastern District of Texas, partly because judges in the Eastern District of 
Texas disfavor summary judgment motions.209 Stipulated dismissals are 
similar between pilot and non-pilot judges excluding the Eastern District of 
Texas, although the difference is still statistically significant. These trends 
continue when one eliminates duplicate plaintiffs asserting cases involving 
the same patent. In that analysis, non-pilot judges resolve more cases 
through summary judgment than pilot judges while pilot judges hold more 
trials than their non-pilot counterparts. 
Figure 4 
 
                                                                                                                           
 208 Both stipulated dismissals and voluntary dismissals are, in essence, settlements. Stipulated 
dismissals are sometimes necessary in cases involving counterclaims, such as cases in which the 
defendant asks for a declaratory judgment of invalidity and/or non-infringement. 
 209 See id. at 251 (characterizing the Eastern District of Texas “hostile” to summary judg-
ments). 
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2. Judge Differences Across Pilot Versus Non-Pilot Judges 
Pilot judges on the whole have more patent experience than non-pilot 
judges, though they have had a shorter tenure as judges than non-pilot judg-
es. Overall, among the cases appealed, non-pilot judges have a median of 
twelve years of experience as a federal district court judge compared to 
eleven years for pilot judges. Not surprisingly, however, pilot judges have 
more experience with patent cases. Within the last five years from February 
2014 through January 2019, pilot judges have presided over a median of 
eighty-one patent cases compared to twenty-eight for non-pilot judges. 
Eliminating the Eastern District of Texas in the pilot cases and the District 
of Delaware for the non-pilot cases, pilot judges presided over a median of 
more than seventy-three patent cases compared to just twenty-eight for non-
pilot judges. Pilot judges also have almost double the amount of trial and 
claim construction experience, overseeing a median number of seven claim 
construction hearings over the past five years compared to just three for 
non-pilot judges. Moreover, pilot judges oversaw a median of two trials 
compared to just one trial for judges in the non-pilot districts. Notable outli-
ers exist among district court judges, as well. For example, Judge James 
Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas has presided over 5,000 
cases to termination; Judge Sue Robinson in the District of Delaware pre-
sided over the next highest figure—almost 700 cases to termination in the 
last five years. Likewise, some judges who have served as many as forty 
years on the bench have presided on only one or two patent cases. 
 
Table 2: Patent Experience by Pilot Judge Status 
 
 Pilot Judge Non-Pilot Judges 
Mean Judicial Tenure 11.1 13.0 
Median Judicial Tenure 11 12 
Mean Terminated Patent 
Cases 
201.7 (101.1)* 93.2 (69.2)* 
Median Terminated Pa-
tent Cases 
81 (73)* 28 (28)* 
Mean Claim Construction 
Hearings 
17.0 (8.7)*         8.3 (4.6)* 
Median Claim Construc-
tion Hearings 
7 (6)* 3 (2)* 
Mean Patent Trials          4.4 (2.5)* 2.4 (1.4)* 
Median Patent Trials 2 (1)* 1 (1)* 
 
* Numbers in parentheses represent figures excluding judges from the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas in pilot courts and the District of Delaware in the non-pilot courts. 
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3. Appealed Cases Comparing Pilot Versus Non-Pilot Judges 
Pilot and non-pilot judges also differ in the type of cases that are de-
cided on the merits and that are ultimately appealed to the CAFC. Less than 
5% of cases in the database continue the appeal process through comple-
tion.210 The appeal rate is slightly higher for cases before non-pilot judges 
(5% v. 3%).211 It is difficult to assess how to measure the “appeal” rate, 
however. In many cases, parties file a notice to appeal, only to settle the 
case or for the case to be dismissed under Federal Circuit Rule 42(a).212 
The present analysis reinforces the notion that variation exists among 
districts in their appeal trends. Williams et al. found that almost 50% of ap-
peals hail from one of the California pilot districts, with 33% of appealed 
pilot cases being filed from one of the three California pilot courts.213 They 
also found that, as a percent of its total cases, the Eastern District of Texas 
saw relatively few of its cases appealed, primarily due to how few cases in 
the Eastern District of Texas end in a judgment on the merits.214 The FJC 
report, however, analyzed all cases, including procedural cases.215 The pre-
sent analysis finds that some districts, like the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania, have a high appeal rate because they resolve a greater percentage of 
substantive patent law cases, whereas other districts, like the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, have a much lower appeal rate with no appealed cases 
involving patent trolls. Table 3 shows the appeal rate for cases for all of the 
pilot districts and select non-pilot districts that heard more than 300 patent 
cases during the time frame under study or who had the most number of 
                                                                                                                           
 210 During the period under study, about one-hundred cases heard on appeal concerned proce-
dural issues, which are not analyzed here but which are included in the calculation of the appeal 
rate. See infra notes 223–230 and accompanying text. 
 211 These figures cover all cases including both substantive and procedural issues. Limited to 
only cases sharing unique plaintiffs asserting the same patents, the appeal rate increases to 6%, 
with a greater percentage of appeals coming from the non-pilot judges (7% v. 6%). Calculations 
based on uniqueness may underestimate the number of unique cases since it may be that two cases 
are alike except that one case involves an additional patent not asserted in the other case. 
 212 To measure appeal rate, this analysis relies on Lex Machina’s codings on appeal rate. This 
measure is somewhat over-inclusive due to the fact that many parties do not continue prosecuting 
their appeal. About 7% of cases were coded with an “appeal” tag on Lex Machina. Cases that 
terminated before January 1, 2016, were then eliminated on the assumption that if the CAFC has 
not issued an opinion as of December 31, 2018, the appeal is no longer pending three years later, 
which brought down the number of completed or pending appealed cases to 4%. There may be 
cases that terminated prior to 2016 that are still pending as of January 1, 2019, as there may be 
some cases that were terminated after 2015 that have since been settled or dismissed. In addition, 
it is impossible to measure the number of potentially appealable issues that may be pending for 
current or past cases. For instance, parties may file an appeal after the grant or denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction. 
 213 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 32. 
 214 Id. at 32, 33. 
 215 Id. at 35. 
2019] Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation 551 
cases appealed. For instance, non-pilot technology-centered districts like the 
Western District of Washington or the Eastern District of Virginia have a 
disproportionate number of cases appealed. The second column displays the 
appeal rate for all cases, while the third column shows the appeal rate for 
cases involving unique plaintiffs and patents. Generally, the appeal rate is 
often higher limiting the analysis to cases involving a unique set of patents. 
For instance, the appeal rate drops to 5% in the Eastern District of Texas 
from 1.9% since almost half of the appealed cases involve patent trolls. 
Overall, these findings coincide with those of Williams et al., namely that 
appeals disproportionately come from the California districts, most notably 
from the Northern District of California.216  
  
                                                                                                                           
 216 See id. at 32 (hypothesizing reasons for varied appeal rates among pilot districts). 
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Table 3: Rate of Appeal for Patent Cases 
 All Cases Unique Cases 
C.D.Cal. 4.3 (3.1)* 5.6 (4.7)* 
N.D.Cal. 10.2 (6.7)* 9.6 (5.6)* 
S.D.Cal. 6.9 (5.9)* 8.2 (9.2)* 
E.D.Tex. 1.9 (1.7)* 5.0 (4.8)* 
N.D.Tex. 5.5 (5.0)* 6.4 (5.8)* 
S.D.N.Y. 6.2 (8.1)* 6.8 (7.5)* 
E.D.N.Y. 3.3 (2.9)* 2.0 (1.4)* 
S.D.Fla. 4.4 (5.6)* 8.0 (13.0)* 
D.Nev. 5.6 (5.5)* 7.4 (7.0)* 
N.D.Ill. 3.8 (3.9)* 5.5 (5.1)* 
D.N.J. 6.0 (7.5)* 6.0 (7.5)* 
D.Md. 4.1 (3.6)* 5.9 (2.9)* 
W.D.Pa. 7.5 (7.7)* 10.8 (11.3)* 
W.D.Tenn. 5.2 (5.3)* 4.2 (4.4)* 
D.Del. 5.8 9.4 
D.Mass. 6.5 9.2 
N.D.Tex. 5.5 6.4 
W.D.Wash. 11.2 9.2 
W.D.Wis. 8.4 11.0 
M.D.Fla. 3.1 4.3 
E.D.Va. 9.8 14.5 
W.D.Tex. 4.8 4.4 
D.Minn. 4.3 3.1 
D.Utah 3.9 4.2 
E.D.Mich. 0 0 
*Signifies cases from pilot judge in a pilot district. 
Almost half of appealed patent cases arise from summary judgment 
motions or consent or stipulated judgments based on the district court’s pri-
or decision on a dispositive motion or after its decision on claim construc-
tion. Dismissals make up about a quarter of appealed patent cases with trials 
and judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) motions splitting the remaining 
quarter. Figure 5 details the spread of case disposition across pilot and non-
pilot judges for cases in which the CAFC either has heard an appeal as of 
December 31, 2018 or an appeal is pending given the definition of appealed 
cases. The types of cases appealed are similar across pilot and non-pilot 
districts. Although Williams et al. concluded that summary judgment mo-
tions made up only 2% of total case dispositions before pilot judges, sum-
mary judgment motions are the most common disposition of cases heard on 
appeal, likely because the stakes are so high for the losing party, which 
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makes the costs of appeal very low.217 Judges may grant summary judgment 
only when litigants do not dispute the case’s facts, so more frivolous or 
clear-cut cases may simply be decided in the local tribunal—often a non-
pilot court—in which the case is first filed.218 That a greater percentage of 
summary judgment (24% v. 22%), dismissal on the pleadings (9% v. 7%), 
and stipulated dismissal (18% v. 15%) appeals originate from non-pilot 
judges provides further support for this assessment.219 Consequently, com-
petitors may move to transfer the case away from the non-pilot judge later 
on in the process should dismissal be denied. Appeals from consent judg-
ments arising most frequently from claim construction rulings are more 
common in cases before pilot judges (9% v. 7%). Figure 6 details the case 
disposition by pilot status involving cases with unique plaintiffs asserting a 
unique group of patents. Here, appeals from jury/JMOL motions (18% v. 
15%) and bench trials (13% v. 10%) are more common before pilot judges. 
As with the analyses on all cases, non-pilot judges have more appealed cas-
es emanating from judgment on the pleadings than pilot judges (27% v. 
19%), but cases dismissed procedurally (18% v. 14%) or by consent judg-
ment (8% v. 5%) are more common before pilot judges. These trends con-
cerning case disposition among appeals involving unique plaintiffs and pa-
tents also are seen when examining just the subset of appealed cases that 
have an issued CAFC opinion as of December 31, 2018 on a substantive 
patent issue. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 217 Id. at 28 tbl.23; see also Klerman & Reilly, supra note 83, at 254 (discussing the pros and 
cons for patentees in seeking trial and avoiding summary judgment). 
 218 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (providing the requirements for summary judgment). 
 219 The FJC similarly reports that there is a statistically significant difference between pilot 
and non-pilot judges in terms of dismissals, finding that non-pilot cases see more voluntarily dis-
missals, a finding which is replicated here. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 14. The present 
analysis also indicates that these differences extend to dismissals granted by stipulated motions to 
dismiss or motions on the pleadings. However, pilot judges have a greater percent of cases on 
appeal concerning procedural motions to dismiss. 
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 Figure 7 details the type of technology at issue in appealed cases bro-
ken down by unique plaintiffs asserting unique patents in order to get a bet-
ter sense of the technology spread. Patents concerning computers and com-
munications take up the largest share of appealed cases. Over 46% percent 
of patent cases arising before pilot judges concern computers and commu-
nications compared to 40% cases before non-pilot judges. Drug cases are 
the next highest category, making up slightly less than a quarter of appealed 
cases from both groups. While cases involving electronic patents are more 
common in appeals from pilot judges, cases concerning the other technolo-
gies—chemical, mechanical, and the catch-all “other” category—are more 
common in the appealed cases coming from the non-pilot judges compared 
to the pilot judges. These patterns persist even if one excludes the Eastern 
District of Texas from the analysis. These broad trends also persist when 
limiting the analysis to only cases where the CAFC has issued an opinion as 
of December 31, 2018 on a substantive patent law issue except that chemi-
cal cases are more prevalent in the non-pilot group and electronics cases are 
more common in the pilot group.  
Figure 7 
 
What does this data suggest about the cases that are not appealed? Of 
the approximately 25,000 cases in the database, 92% of the cases are not 
appealed or the appeals end in dismissal or settlement. Figure 8 details a 
graph of the case disposition of cases that are not considered appealed. 
Across districts, the vast majority of non-appealed cases end up settling or 
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being resolved by consent decrees. But, there are some noticeable differ-
ences across pilot and non-pilot judges. For instance, of the non-appealed 
cases before pilot judges, pilot judges see more stipulated dismissals (64% 
v. 56%) and cases in which the plaintiff voluntarily agrees to dismiss the 
case.220 The opposite is true for cases resolved by summary judgment mo-
tions; of the non-appealed cases, non-pilot judges resolve more cases by 
summary judgment or procedural motions to dismiss. Although a fuller de-
scription of the characteristics of non-appealed cases is beyond the scope of 
this Article, the data nonetheless suggest differences between appealed and 
non-appealed cases and between pilot and non-pilot judges.221 
Figure 8 
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: HOW HAS THE PILOT  
PATENT PROGRAM FARED? 
This Part details the statistical analysis of the impact of the pilot pro-
gram so far in terms of how district court judges decide cases and how those 
cases are ultimately resolved on appeal.222 
                                                                                                                           
 220 Further, the difference is even less stark when excluding the Eastern District of Texas from 
the pilot group and the District of Delaware from the non-pilot group from the analysis (54% v. 
53% for stipulated dismissals and 33% v. 30% for plaintiff voluntary dismissals). 
 221 In a separate article, I study how pilot judges differ from non-pilot judges in how they 
decide cases. See Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Patent Law in the District Courts 
(working paper) (on file with author) (examining district court decision making in patent cases 
over the last ten years). 
 222 See infra notes 223–300 and accompanying text. 
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A. Case Selection 
The present analysis relies upon all substantive patent law cases filed 
from September 19, 2011 to September 30, 2016 and decided by the CAFC 
through December 2018.223 As a separate measure, the analysis also reviews 
district court rulings drawn from all CAFC decisions published on the 
CAFC website that were decided after January 1, 2012. Additionally, the 
database of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP assisted 
with the tracking of appellate patent cases.224 Each trial court and appellate 
court decision was coded for both the specific patent law issue addressed as 
well as the overall result as to whether the patentee or the competitor pre-
vailed. Applicable data was cross-checked using the Compendium of Feder-
al Circuit decisions.225 This analysis includes all decisions from the CAFC, 
including summary affirmances under Rule 36, but omits cases that were 
dismissed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) because those 
decisions were not on the merits.226 The analysis focuses on the following 
key issues: validity, infringement, claim construction, inequitable conduct, 
and preliminary injunctions. 
Notably, several broad categories of cases are excluded from the anal-
ysis. Jury verdict cases are eliminated unless they are accompanied by the 
                                                                                                                           
 223 Eight of the pilot districts started the program on the recommended date of September 19, 
2011: Central District of California, Southern District of California, Northern District of Illinois, 
District of Maryland, District of Nevada, Western District of Pennsylvania, Western District of 
Tennessee, and the Eastern District of Texas. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 n.5. The other 
pilot courts started on the following dates: September 1, 2011, for the Northern District of Texas, 
September 18, 2011, for the District of New Jersey, November 21, 2011, for the Southern District 
of New York, January 1, 2012, for the Northern District of California, and January 10, 2012, for 
the Eastern District of New York. Id. For the ease of the analysis, this study uses a uniform start 
date of September 19, 2011. 
 224 Federal Circuit IP Decisions, FINNEGAN, https://www.finnegan.com/en/tools/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3XX-D7UY]. The Lex Machina database omitted some cases that were located 
on Finnegan’s website and confirmed on the Federal Circuit website. Those cases are not included 
in the study. 
 225 Federal Circuit Decisions Database, U. IOWA, https://fedcircuit.shinyapps.io/federal
compendium [https://perma.cc/T6GL-4874]. For discussion of the methodology and contents of the 
Compendium of Federal Circuit decisions, see The Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions, U. 
IOWA, https://empirical.law.uiowa.edu/compendium-federal-circuit-decisions and Jason Rantanen, 
The Landscape of Modern Patent Appeals, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 985 (2018). 
 226 Compare FED. CIR. R. 36 (allowing “[t]he court [to] enter a judgment of affirmance with-
out opinion”), with FED. R. APP. P. 42(b) (providing for voluntary dismissal of an appeal “if the 
parties file a signed dismissal agreement”). Although the CAFC may affirm without a written 
opinion, it cannot use Rule 36 to reverse. Rule 36 affirmances are used most often for minor issues 
or frivolous appeals but they are also used occasionally when the district court writes so thorough 
an opinion that it is not necessary for the CAFC to add its own reasoning by issuing an opinion. 
Ultimately, claim construction issues are less likely to be affirmed under Rule 36 than are other 
patent-related issues. Olson, supra note 132, at 772. 
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court ruling on a JMOL motion.227 Default judgments, or cases in which the 
parties do not resolve any substantive patent law issue and the court awards 
relief to the non-defaulting party, are excluded, as are non-final judgments, 
such as denials of motions to dismiss or denials of summary judgment be-
cause these issues are not appealed. Furthermore, cases do not appear where 
the issue in dispute primarily concerns an issue of state law, with the patent 
law issue being tangential to the main issue of the case.228 The few cases in 
which the district court hears the case on remand from the CAFC or the Su-
preme Court and the appeal comes up for a second or even a third time are 
also excluded. Because the CAFC may give detailed guidance on the law in 
the case in the prior appeal, inclusion of these cases in the analysis could 
cloud the results. Therefore, the case is included only if the issues were sep-
arate; that is, one case includes a preliminary injunction motion and the 
second case is decided on the merits.229  
The analysis focuses solely on cases in which the court makes a deci-
sion on a substantive patent law issue. As such, purely procedural cases are 
excluded, such as cases concerning whether to transfer a case from one dis-
trict court to another by seeking a writ of mandamus; whether personal ju-
risdiction should be exercised over a given company; various discovery 
matters, such as whether to include or exclude expert testimony or whether 
to issue a subpoena; whether the complaint properly pleads the facts; and 
cases that primarily concern damages or willful infringement. Moreover, 
cases dealing with whether a party should be held in contempt for violating 
an injunction or should be sanctioned for engaging in discovery abuse are 
eliminated. Cases concerning whether there should be a stay pending reex-
amination or inter partes review are also not included because the decision 
does not rest on the merits. Cases in which the CAFC rules on the frivo-
lousness of the patentee’s case and the accordant award of attorneys’ fees to 
the losing party do not appear in the analysis. Also not included are cases 
based on jurisdiction, personal or subject matter, or whether legal principles 
preclude a patent infringement claim, such as if a pending arbitration or li-
                                                                                                                           
 227 A jury verdict without a JMOL motion is rare, so only a few cases are excluded under this 
criterion. 
 228 Based on the data, cases focused on state law with tangential patent law issues occur fre-
quently in cases involving licenses. Although as a factual matter, the CAFC has jurisdiction in 
patent license cases, the issue in those cases centers more on contract interpretation than patent 
law. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 112, at 65 n.176, 68 (outlining the patent-related jurisdiction of 
the CAFC); Rifkind, supra note 114, at 425 (discussing areas of the law overlapping with patent 
law). Some of these cases are coded by Lex Machina as contract cases and were not included in 
the database. 
 229 For more details about the statistical analysis, see the online Appendix at 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-2/semet-
appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRK9-KJZ5]. 
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cense bars suit. Finally, the analysis excludes all appeals from the former 
Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences (now the Patent Trial and Appeals 
Board, or PTAB) and the USITC, two administrative agencies within which 
the CAFC holds exclusive review, because the object of this study is to ana-
lyze the impact of specialization in the district courts, not in the administra-
tive state.230 
B. Key Variables of Interest 
1. Dependent Variable: Predicting Reversal 
The key dependent variable is whether the CAFC overturns the district 
court decision. There were two alternative variables, similar to Kesan and 
Ball’s study: complete reversal and partial reversal.231 In some cases, rely-
ing on the label given by the CAFC to a given case is misleading; for in-
stance, the CAFC may affirm and remand the case but the case is remanded 
on a purely technical or minor issue that has nothing to do with the “wrong-
ness” of the lower court’s decision. As such, each case was read to discern 
whether the CAFC actually found fault with all or part of the lower court’s 
decision. In most cases, these findings comport with the CAFC’s classifica-
tions, but to the extent they do not, this analysis relies on an independent 
reading of the case.  
The outcome of each case is coded on a sliding scale to measure the 
accuracy of the decision in one of the following categories: affirmed; af-
firmed, vacated, and remanded; affirmed, reversed, and vacated; affirmed 
and reversed; vacated and remanded; vacated; reversed, vacated, and re-
manded; reversed and remanded; and reversed. The variable is then dichot-
omized into two binary choices: whether the decision is fully affirmed or 
there is an error in part.232 In determining whether there is an error in part, 
different criteria create two different versions of the variable. One version 
of the variable considers all cases that are “vacated and remanded,” “vacat-
ed,” “reversed, vacated, and remanded,” “reversed and remanded,” and “re-
versed” to be ones in which there is an “error.” Each case is examined to 
ascertain the seriousness of the error. For instance, if the CAFC largely af-
firms the trial court, but refuses to find that the defendant acts willfully, 
                                                                                                                           
 230 Because this analysis is organized by case instead of by appeal, it does not risk including 
cross appeals, which would result in double counts. Cross appeals are noted and the case facts 
were considered when discerning whether the ruling favored the patentee or the competitor. The 
case was then coded accordingly. 
 231 See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 433 (characterizing “appellate rulings as either fully 
affirming a district court’s decision . . . or not”). 
 232 See id. at 434 (“Second, and separately, we distinguished appellate rulings on issues as 
either affirmed ‘fully or in part’ or found to be completely in error . . . .”). This study includes as 
overturned in full both reversed and vacated cases. 
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damages would increase three-fold. That scenario is an affirmance in spirit, 
especially if the main issues in the case are ones of infringement and validi-
ty; the court is simply declining to award more damages.233 By contrast, if 
the patentee appeals a damage issue and the CAFC devotes all or most of its 
opinion to analyze the damage issue, the CAFC’s decision on willfulness is 
the primary issue in the case and thus is not included in the analysis, be-
cause the universe of cases only concerns substantive patent law issues.  
Overall, across pilot and non-pilot judges, the CAFC overwhelmingly 
affirms cases, at least in part. Limited to only substantive cases involving 
infringement, validity, inequitable conduct, claim construction, and prelimi-
nary injunctions and including Rule 36 affirmances, the CAFC overrules 
about 15% of cases in full and between 20–25% in part, depending upon the 
definition of “in part.” Although pilot judges have a slightly higher overrule 
rate, the difference is not statistically significant. Restricting the analysis to 
cases resolved by opinion, as opposed to Rule 36, the spread between pilot 
and non-pilot courts increases.  
Each “main mistake” made by the district court, as perceived by the 
appellate court, is coded as belonging to one of eight categories: (1) claim 
construction; (2) infringement  non-infringement;( 3) non-infringement 
 infringement; (4) patent invalid  patent valid; (5) patent valid  patent 
invalid; (6) ruling that a preliminary injunction should not issue  ruling 
that it should issue; (7) ruling that a preliminary injunction should issue  
ruling that it should not issue; and (8) other errors such as errors concerning 
damages or regarding inequitable conduct. In particular, coding for error in 
claim construction analysis can be difficult. When ruling on infringement or 
invalidity, courts must often construe the claims to aid in their analysis, so 
sometimes it can be difficult to tell if the CAFC reverses a lower court deci-
sion because of claim construction or because of some other issue like in-
fringement or invalidity. Moreover, because interlocutory appeal is not 
available for claim construction issues, claim construction only arises in the 
context of an infringement or invalidity action.234 As such, each case is read 
to determine if claim construction is the “main mistake.” Sometimes it is 
easy to discern where the case primarily concerns claim construction be-
cause the CAFC makes it clear or because the case results from a consent 
judgment where the parties stipulate to infringement based on the district 
court’s claim construction. Other times the determination requires an indi-
vidualized judgment call. In most of the infringement cases, the issue boils 
down to claim construction. Parties may also contest the written description, 
                                                                                                                           
 233 The database excludes the cases that only considered as an issue whether to grant or deny 
attorneys’ fees. If fees were one of several issues, however, the case was included. 
 234 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2018). 
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definiteness, best mode, or enablement of the patent under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112.235 Such determinations, especially analysis under section 112, require 
interpretation of the claims and could arguably be considered claim con-
struction cases, but because application of the law of validity is paramount 
in such an analysis, the cases were counted as validity cases (or validity 
mistakes in this instance). 
Non-pilot judges make different kinds of mistakes than pilot judges. 
Non-pilot judges in particular are more likely than pilot judges to make er-
rors when claim construction is a dispositive issue in the case (39% of the 
primary mistakes for non-pilot judges versus 31% for pilot judges). Another 
third of the primary mistakes made by non-pilot judges concern improperly 
finding a patent invalid while almost a quarter of the primary mistakes by 
pilot judges concern improper denial of preliminary injunctions. Pilot judg-
es also have a greater percentage of cases than non-pilot judges with in-
fringement mistakes. 
2. Key Independent Variable: Judicial Experience and Inclusion in Pilot 
Program 
The key independent variable in the case is judicial experience. Other 
scholars code for judicial experience.236 Shartzer, for instance, looks at pre-
vious appellate experience, whereas Schwartz relies specifically on patent 
trial experience.237 Kesan and Ball analyze general experience, measured as 
the number of years the judge serves on the bench, as well as specialized 
experience, measured by experience in patent law cases.238 They also look 
at both cumulative experience, measured by the judge’s total number of pa-
tent cases heard over their time on the bench, as well as recent patent law 
experience ascertained by looking at how many cases they heard in the 
three years prior to the filing date of the case in question.239 
The present analysis uses a direct account of judicial experience to test 
whether the judges participating in the pilot program act differently than 
judges not participating in the program. As such, one version of the “experi-
ence” variable is a dummy variable coded “1” for whether the judge in 
                                                                                                                           
 235 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018). 
 236 See, e.g., Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 420 (considering how experience might influence 
patent law litigation metrics); Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 240–41 (con-
sidering judicial experience on the bench and with patent cases); Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228 
(coding for judicial experience with patent cases). 
 237 Compare Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 240–41 (gathering career 
biographical information and the number of patent cases heard by the judge between 1995–2005), 
with Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228 (considering years served and “history of appellate review at 
the [CAFC]”). 
 238 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 420, 423. 
 239 Id. at 423 & n.187. 
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question participates in the pilot program (and coded “0” if the judge is not 
a participant). An alternative experience variable focuses on whether the 
trial judge in question is part of a district participating in the pilot program. 
Although that particular judge may not be a part of the project, judges sit-
ting in districts participating in the project may have de facto access, greater 
resources, or more knowledge by being in close physical proximity to judg-
es who are part of the pilot program. 
Other “experience” variables that may be a better reflection of experi-
ence are also included. The patent pilot program proposed by the House of 
Representatives initially excluded some of the judges who hear the greatest 
number of patent cases by requiring that any participating district have at 
least ten judgeships.240 The final statute, however, includes smaller districts, 
like the Eastern District of Texas.241 Notably, the pilot program excludes the 
District of Delaware, which historically is one of the most popular patent 
filing districts.242 One judge in Delaware, Judge Sue Robinson, heard more 
cases that were subsequently appealed than any other judge in the database. 
Furthermore, certain judges in Massachusetts, Arizona, Wisconsin, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Virginia, and other states have developed regional experi-
ence in patent law cases, as measured by the number of appeals in the short 
time frame under study. As such, this analysis created two alternative 
measures of “experience.” In the first measure, judges from the District of 
Delaware are added to the list of pilot program judges as 16% of the cases 
in the database hail from Delaware. Alternatively, a variable coded as “1” 
any judge in the database who has above the median number of patent trials 
(fifty-eight) in the past five years. 
These measures may not necessarily be a fair measure of “experience.” 
Particular judges may have a lot of experience in patent litigation, but for 
whatever reason, many of the cases from their courtroom end up settling. A 
judge could have experience in infringement analysis but not in validity 
determinations or in holding Markman hearings. As the FJC reported, alt-
hough Markman hearings are held in 4% of cases, more than half (60%) of 
Markman hearings are held before pilot judges.243 
In addition to the pilot judge variable, this analysis includes an addi-
tional measure of patent experience, measured by the number of patent cas-
                                                                                                                           
 240 See 153 CONG. REC. 3713 (2007) (outlining the proposed requirements); Shartzer, supra 
note 29, at 198, 199 n.65 (discussing the program’s initial requirements). 
 241 See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675 (2011) 
(providing two sets of eligibility criteria based on the district’s number of judgeships); WILLIAMS 
ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 n.5 (naming the districts participating in the patent pilot program). 
 242 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 9, at 17 fig.3 (tracking the “[n]umber of 
[d]efendants in [p]atent [i]nfringement [s]uits” in Delaware). 
 243 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 88, at 23. 
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es filed before a given judge in the last five years. As alternative measures 
of “trial experience,” this study uses (1) the number of patent trials presided 
over by the judge; and (2) the number of formal claim construction hearings 
presided over by the judge.244 These results stem from the Lex Machina da-
tabase by researching judges and matching their patent case, trial, and claim 
construction experience from February 2014 through January 2019. Be-
cause all of these variables present similar patterns, for ease of analysis, 
only the first measure is used in the regressions presented here. The analysis 
also measures the number of years the judge has served on the bench since 
their initial presidential appointment. Further, the study constructs a varia-
ble for whether the judge previously sat by designation at the CAFC with 
the hypothesis that judges who previously sat by designation are less likely 
to be reversed on appeal.245 Overall, 18% of the judges who have substan-
tive patent cases heard on appeal previously served as visitors on the 
CAFC.246 
3. Other Independent Variables 
This study collects information about the patent, including the patent 
number and whether there are multiple patents asserted in the litigation. It 
also notes the technological category of the patent. John R. Allison, Mark A. 
Lemley, and Joshua Walker concluded that software-related patents are 
among the most litigated patent types.247 For ease of analysis of the data 
presented, cases are characterized according to one of the six National Bu-
reau of Economic Research (“NBER”) categories: (1) chemical; (2) com-
puter and communications; (3) drug and medical; (4) electronics and elec-
trical; (5) mechanical; and (6) other, including design patents.248  
In addition to using the technological category to classify patent types, 
it is also important to assess the patent’s complexity. Judges in certain dis-
tricts may hear cases involving more complex technology than are heard in 
other districts, and as such, failure to control for complexity could obscure 
                                                                                                                           
 244 Judges do not need to interpret the claims through a formal Markman hearing. They could 
also interpret the claims in the context of deciding a motion such as a summary judgment motion. 
 245 See Lemley & Miller, supra note 159, at 466 (finding that judges who previously sat by 
designation at the CAFC were 15% less likely to be reversed on an appeal, a statistically signifi-
cant result). 
 246 See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, VISITING JUDGES (2015), http://
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial-reports/vjchartforwebsite2006-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PG5W-UTZB] (listing visiting judges). 
 247 John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009). 
 248 See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 242 (positing that diverse case 
characteristics “are not randomly distributed throughout the judicial districts”). 
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the results because reversals may be more common in complex cases.249 
Kesan and Ball coded for “the presence of a dissenting opinion,” reasoning 
that “a dissent is a proxy for the complexity of the technology in issue(s) 
. . . and . . . the difficulty of the decision.”250 Instead of the presence of a 
dissent, this analysis codes for the number of entries on the district court 
docket sheet, opining that more complex cases will have more entries on 
their docket sheet. To better capture complexity, in other specifications not 
reported here, the analysis notes how many citations each patent has to oth-
er patents and other non-patent literature, as well as the number of citations 
other patents make to that specific patent, on the theory that patents of 
greater economic consequence tend to get cited more and that more com-
plex patents would have more citations.251 
For each case, a variety of other data was collected relating to the liti-
gants and the judges hearing the case at the district court and appellate lev-
el. The analysis accounts for the procedural posture of the case. Lemley and 
Miller found higher reversal rates for appeals involving claim construction 
than for cases involving summary judgment, a jury trial, or JMOL when 
compared to the reference category of bench trials.252 For purposes of the 
present analysis, consent judgments are coded as summary judgment mo-
tions, because in the patent realm, parties often stipulate to non-
infringement when claim construction is the primary issue on appeal. In 
addition, cases are coded on whether they are precedential as well as 
whether they are resolved under Rule 36. 
This study also analyzes information about the parties in the case, in-
cluding whether the plaintiff filed multiple patent suits against other parties 
signifying that they were a “high-volume” plaintiff.253 Overall, patent trolls, 
or NPEs, may be more likely to be affirmed as they may be less risk adverse 
and appeal more often.254 Also collected is information about the federal 
                                                                                                                           
 249 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 418–19. 
 250 See id. at 432 (discussing key variables). 
 251 See Allison et al., supra note 247, at 4–5, 14 (noting which patents are frequently cited). 
 252 Lemley & Miller, supra note 159, at 466 (noting, however, that these procedural results 
were significant at 90% confidence). 
 253 This analysis assesses whether a plaintiff is a “high-volume” plaintiff by analyzing wheth-
er the same plaintiff filed other suits against the same or multiple defendants involving the same 
patents from September 2011 through January 2019. If a plaintiff filed ten or more such suits, the 
plaintiff is characterized as “high-volume.” Lex Machina also codes for “High-Volume Plaintiff” 
to capture patentees who routinely file lawsuits. In alternative specifications, this analysis used the 
Lex Machina measure as well as a combined measure using both criteria. Using the first-measure, 
19% of appealed cases in the present analysis involve a “high-volume” plaintiff whereas 16% of 
considered cases were “high-volume” using the second measure, with 28% of cases being high-
volume using the third measure. This measure is more expansive than simply including patent 
trolls. For instance, large pharmaceutical companies are considered “high-volume” plaintiffs. 
 254 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 2163–65 (2013) (arguing that NPEs may express less anxiety about reputation and 
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court judges and the CAFC panel, including the ideology of the judges as 
represented by the party of the appointing president, whether they have a 
scientific background, and their general judicial and patent experience.255 
Judge Moore found that political ideology played little to no role in decision 
making.256 Other scholars conclude that ideology is especially pertinent in 
influencing decision making for specialized judges.257 Miller and Curry the-
orized that concerns related to patent rights mirror concerns about monopo-
lies in general, with Democrats wanting to invalidate patents more frequent-
ly and Republicans desiring to preserve the property right.258 Each judge is 
assigned an ideology score based on the party of the appointing president, 
which is a common technique in judicial politics for the study of the federal 
judiciary.259 
Unobservable, non-random differences may exist among district courts 
or between courts in the pilot program and those outside it.260 To control for 
differences among districts, dummy variables are used per district.261 Some 
district courts hear more cases than others.262 Kesan and Ball found that pa-
tent cases as a proportion of all civil cases ranged from a high of 6.75% in 
Delaware to a low of almost zero in courts like the Southern District of 
Mississippi.263 Additionally, other differences could exist between districts 
in terms of how cases are managed or workload is allocated.264 Most of the 
district level dummy variables are dropped because those variables often 
                                                                                                                           
appeal anyway); Shawn P. Miller, “Fuzzy” Software Patents Boundaries and High Claim Con-
struction Reversal Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809, 830 (2014), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/
fuzzysoftware.pdf [https://perma.cc/263C-732X]. 
 255 Information on judges’ scientific backgrounds can be found by the using the Almanac of 
the Federal Judiciary. Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, WOLTERS KLUWER (last visited Dec. 26, 
2018), https://almanacofthefederaljudiciary.com/terms_condtions [https://perma.cc/R335-8BXB]; 
see, e.g., Shartzer, supra note 29, at 228 n.304 (using the Almanac for the same purpose). 
 256 Moore, supra note 22, at 27 & n.99 (finding no difference between Democratic and Re-
publican judges in claim construction). 
 257 See, e.g., Golden, supra note 8, at 557 & n.22 (analyzing political ideology in the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit); Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 857 (finding that differences that 
exist in decision making in patent cases are correlated to judges’ perceived ideologies). 
 258 Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 850 (construing differences between Democrats and 
Republicans as based on economic philosophies). 
 259 Such scores are called “DW-NOMINATE” scores and were used to calculate the median 
score for the CAFC panel. See DESCRIPTION OF NOMINATE DATA (July 13, 2004), http://k7moa.
com/page2a.htm [https://perma.cc/ZQX9-RRCL] (explaining types of “NOMINATE Coordinates”). 
 260 Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 425. 
 261 Alternative specifications are used to assess court congestion by using the weighted aver-
age of all case filings per judge, per Kesan and Ball. See id. at 424–25 (controlling for court con-
gestion). 
 262 Id. at 424. 
 263 Id. Kesan and Ball found that “the number of patent cases per judge varie[s] from 17.61 in 
[the District of] Delaware to 0.04 in [the District of] New Mexico.” Id. 
 264 Id. at 425 & n.192. 
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perfectly predict the outcome of the case given that so many district judges 
hear only one or two cases during the period under study. As such, the anal-
ysis included dummy variables only for the Eastern District of Texas, the 
District of Delaware, and the Northern District of California. The lower 
court decision is also controlled for because it may be more common to 
simply affirm the lower court regardless of whether the lower court decision 
is pro-patentee. 
Alternative specifications not reported here used the variable “sum-
mary motion” to control for the degree of fact-finding by the lower court. 
When the lower court rules on a motion for summary judgment or a motion 
to dismiss on the pleadings, the court purportedly is only supposed to grant 
the motion if no genuine disputes about any material facts exist or if the 
party fails to state a case at the pleading stage.265 Miller and Curry found 
that cases involving a summary motion had a 25% increased chance of the 
CAFC invalidating the patent.266 Additionally, although the period of study 
is fairly short, “a time-varying effect” could exist, as changes in the econo-
my or national political events could impact decision making.267 Time was 
measured by using year dummy variables for each year from 2011 to 2016 
based on the filing date of the case as well as a time trend variable in alter-
native specifications. 
The presented specification uses standard errors clustered by judge.268 
Unobserved characteristics of a given judge that impact the analysis may be 
left unmeasured by other variables. Some judges such as Judge Sue Robin-
son from Delaware or Judge James Rodney Gilstrap have more than twenty 
cases heard on appeal. One might also expect correlation between cases 
presided over by the same judge. In alternative specifications, standard er-
rors were clustered at the case-level. However, less than 5% of the cases 
involved appeals of different issues in the same case. Table 4 presents the 
summary statistics. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 265 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (setting forth the standard for summary judgment). 
 266 Miller & Curry, supra note 34, at 857. 
 267 See Kesan & Ball, supra note 1, at 425 (considering influences that could result in “a time-
varying effect”). 
 268 In alternative specifications, errors were clustered by court. Moreover, since judges are 
nested within district courts, alternative models used a multilevel measure to assess the relation-
ship. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Select Variables, Substantive  
Appealed Cases 
 
Variable Med. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Pilot Judge 0 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Pilot District 1 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Pilot Judge+DE 1 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Median Cases 1 0.67 0.47 0 1 
# Patent Cases 1,991 2,917.52 1,974.81 1 5,115 
Tenure 3 4.99 6.17 0 50 
Designated Judge     0 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Docket 28 59.93 96.58 5 1,952 
High-Volume P 0 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Pleadings 0 0.22       0.41 0 1 
Sum. Jud. 1 0.84       0.37 0 1 
Bench Trial 0 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Jury Trial/JMOL  0 0.13 0.33 0 1 
PI 0 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Claim 0 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Infringe 0 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Validity 1          0.57 0.50 0 1 
Inequit. Cond. 0 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Chemical  0 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Computers  1 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Drug  0 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Electronics  0 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Mechanical  0 0.07 0.25 0      1 
Other Technology  0 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Lower Court      0 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Filing Year   2014 2013 0.145 2011 2016 
CAFC Ideology   -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 0.72 
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C. The Statistical Models 
1. Overview 
The statistical model uses two approaches: logit regression analysis 
and regression analysis after conducting propensity score matching. Be-
cause assortment into the pilot and non-pilot districts is not random, the re-
sults of any statistical analysis could be biased if not properly accounting 
for the factors that influence the probability of being in or out of the “treat-
ment” group. In regression analysis, despite attempts to “control” for factors 
that may influence the propensity to be in one group or another, lingering 
bias in the results may still exist. As such, to further buttress the robustness 
of the analysis, in addition to using regression, a propensity score matching 
is also used as an alternative measure. Propensity score matching seeks to 
predict the probability of being in the treatment category, which here would 
be having a case heard before a pilot judge. The first stage regression esti-
mates the probability of receiving the treatment; that is, what factors influ-
ence the propensity to be in the “treatment” group before a pilot judge? Af-
ter estimating that probability based on a propensity score, treatment and 
control cases can be matched based on their propensity score so as to mimic 
randomization through the creation of both a treatment and control group 
that are comparable on all covariates except for the treatment (here, pilot 
status). 
An example illustrates the point. Suppose there are two cases involv-
ing invalidity on a chemical patent, with the only difference being that one 
is heard before a pilot judge and the other before a non-pilot judge. Those 
cases are “matched” so that they would be comparable on all relevant co-
variates except for the treatment category. Doing the analysis in this way 
overcomes some of the causality issues that occur when, as here, the treat-
ment (being in the pilot program) is not a random occurrence.269 
2. Results 
Moving to test the hypotheses, a logit regression model is employed 
first to estimate the impact that inclusion in the pilot program has on wheth-
er the decision of the judge in question is overturned in full or in part on 
appeal. Logit models estimate the impact of a given variable on the proba-
bility that a given event will occur. If the coefficient on the variable is posi-
tive, then the probability of the event occurring increases whereas if the 
                                                                                                                           
 269 An instrumental variable approach can also be used to combat some of the causality issues. 
It is difficult, however, to find an instrument to explain the treatment (for example, being in the 
pilot program) that would not otherwise influence the result (for example, being overruled). 
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event is negative, then the probability of a reversal, either in whole or in 
part, decreases. The equation is as follows: 
Pr(Overulei = 1) = Φ (α0 + β1Specialized Courti + β2CaseCharacteristicsi + 
β3Judge Characteristicsi + λ Other Controlsi)  
Table 5 gives the results when the impact is measured across legal issues 
where there is a complete reversal. The variable of interest—specialized 
judge—is measured in a few different ways as discussed in Section B.270 
This variable does not reach statistical significance for any construction of 
the dependent variable. Variables directed at the number of patent cases 
filed before that particular judge—or alternatively, in other specifications, 
number of trials, or the number of claim construction hearings—also do not 
affect the outcome. However, judges with more experience are more likely 
to be overruled, though the effect is small and barely statistically signifi-
cant. For each additional ten years on the bench, the judge has a 5% greater 
chance of being overruled. 
Interestingly, the results indicate to a statistically significant degree 
that district court judges who previously served as designated judges on the 
CAFC are 11% less likely to have their cases reversed on appeal holding all 
other variables at their median. This is a stunning result which suggests that 
Lemley and Miller’s findings to that effect extend beyond claim construc-
tion decisions.271  
Other variables reach statistical significance at conventional levels of 
95% confidence. Holding other variables at their median, a case with the 
main issue being claim construction has an 9% greater chance of being 
overruled whereas cases involving high-volume plaintiffs are 17% more 
likely to be reversed in full. In addition, the CAFC is 8% more likely to re-
verse in full when issuing a precedential opinion. It is also 12% less likely 
to reverse in infringement cases, owing perhaps to the large number of non-
infringement cases that are affirmed on appeal under Rule 36. Other varia-
bles such as the most of the technological categories (except mechanical) 
and variables dealing with the procedural posture of the case are not signifi-
cant. Since nearly 75% of CAFC panels during this period have a liberal 
median ideology score owing to so many CAFC judges being appointed by 
Democratic presidents, it is of no surprise that the ideology variable is not 
significant here. Judges from Delaware are 11% more likely to be reversed 
in full. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 270 See supra notes 231–268. 
 271 See Lemley & Miller, supra note 159, at 460 (finding lower reversal rates for judges who 
have sat by designation at the CAFC). Appealed cases in which a Federal Circuit judge sat by 
designation on the lower court are eliminated. 
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Table 5: Logit Estimation of Likelihood of CAFC Overruling  
Decision in Full 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pilot Pilot Dist. Pilot+DE Median 
     
Specialized -0.118 -0.081 -0.118 -0.168 
 (0.462) (0.456) (0.462) (0.442) 
     
Patent Cases -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
     
Tenure 0.046* 0.046* 0.046* 0.048** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
     
Designated -1.019* -1.027* -1.019* -1.005* 
 (0.470) (0.467) (0.470) (0.480) 
     
Docket 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
     
Claim  0.843* 0.844* 0.843* 0.856* 
 (0.369) (0.371) (0.369) (0.382) 
     
High-Vol. 1.574*** 1.570*** 1.574*** 1.600*** 
 (0.385) (0.386) (0.385) (0.384) 
     
Infringe -1.130** -1.121** -1.130** -1.114** 
 (0.424) (0.426) (0.424) (0.432) 
     
Validity -0.387 -0.379 -0.387 -0.370 
 (0.378) (0.377) (0.378) (0.374) 
     
Inequ. Cond. 0.276 0.275 0.276 0.247 
 (1.160) (1.154) (1.160) (1.161) 
     
Precedent 0.780* 0.780* 0.780* 0.774* 
 (0.370) (0.371) (0.370) (0.376) 
     
Procedural Included Included Included Included 
     
Lower Ct. Included Included Included Included 
     
Technology Included Included Included Included 
     
Ideology Included Included Included Included 
     
District Ct. Included Included Included Included 
     
Year Included Included Included Included 
_cons -2.965*** -2.953*** -2.965*** -2.956*** 
 (0.765) (0.831) (0.765) (0.778) 
N 434 434 434 434 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by judge. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 Table 6 shows the results broken down by partial reversals. The results 
are similar to those displayed in Table 5, with neither the pilot variables nor 
the patent experience variables reaching statistical significance. The effect 
of having served as a designated judge is enhanced; judges who previously 
sat by designation had a 15% decreased likelihood of being reversed in part. 
As with the analysis involving full reversals, holding other variables at their 
median results in a 14% increased likelihood of reversal in part for cases 
involving claim construction. High-volume plaintiffs and precedential cases 
both have about 17-18% increased likelihood of being reversed in part, with 
other variables at their median. Judges who served longer are 5% more like-
ly to be reversed in part with ten additional years of service. 
The results on partial reversals display some differences from total re-
versals. Unlike the analysis for full reversals, the infringement variable is 
not significant but those seeking summary judgment have a 14% decreased 
chance of being reversed in part holding other variables at their median. 
More complex cases, as measured by the number of docket entries, have a 
3% increased chance of getting reversed in part with an additional one-
hundred pages added to the docket sheet. Like the analysis involving full 
reversals, neither the technological or most of the procedural variables are 
statistically significant. Nonetheless, as shown in the statistical results, little 
difference exists in appellate court treatment based on the specialization of 
the judge. This specification is robust to alternative codings of some of the 
variables and to different ways of clustering the standard errors. Alternative 
specifications are listed in the online appendix, which also provides a fuller 
treatment of each table.272 
  
                                                                                                                           
 272 For more information on additional specifications and to see each table in full, see the 
online Appendix, supra note 229. 
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Table 6: Logit Estimation of Likelihood of CAFC  
Overruling Decision in Part 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pilot  Pilot Dist. DE+Pilot    Median 
     
Specialized -0.257 -0.110 -0.257 -0.141 
 (0.389) (0.370) (0.389) (0.352) 
     
Patent Cases 0.00002 -0.00006 0.00002 0.000007 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
     
Tenure 0.033* 0.033* 0.033* 0.034* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
Designated -1.044** -1.064** -1.044** -1.048** 
 (0.357) (0.355) (0.357) (0.356) 
     
Docket 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
     
Claim  0.964** 0.960** 0.964** 0.969** 
 (0.325) (0.327) (0.325) (0.332) 
     
High-Vol. 1.296** 1.283** 1.296** 1.307** 
 (0.408) (0.407) (0.408) (0.407) 
     
Infringe -0.594 -0.577 -0.594 -0.575 
 (0.328) (0.333) (0.328) (0.332) 
     
Validity 0.011 0.024 0.011 0.028 
 (0.352) (0.351) (0.352) (0.349) 
     
Inequ. Cond. 0.178 0.183 0.178 0.172 
 (1.178) (1.165) (1.178) (1.162) 
     
Precedent 1.236*** 1.244*** 1.236*** 1.245*** 
 (0.260) (0.261) (0.260) (0.261) 
     
Procedural Included Included Included Included 
     
Lower Ct. Included Included Included Included 
     
Technology Included Included Included Included 
     
Ideology Included Included Included Included 
     
District Ct. Included Included Included Included 
     
Year Included Included Included Included 
_cons -2.061** -2.074** -2.061** -2.100** 
 (0.701) (0.723) (0.701) (0.703) 
N 434 434 434 434 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by judge. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Next, the study considers the results using the propensity score meth-
od.273 To do this analysis, first the propensity to be included in the pilot 
group is estimated using many of the same independent variables discussed 
in Section B to predict whether a case would be considered part of the 
“treatment.” Based on the qualitative analysis previously discussed, several 
factors suggest a greater proclivity to be included in a pilot district.274 Fig-
ure 9 displays the results by calculating the standardized percentage bias 
across covariates. Symbols marked by a black circle represent the values for 
the treatment category, in this case, being a pilot judge. Symbols marked by 
an “x” show the values after the matching, and ideally one wants to get as 
close as possible to the “0” line so as to minimize the bias across covariates. 
Not surprisingly, cases concerning computers and communications are more 
likely to be heard in a pilot district as are cases with longer docket sheets, 
indicating more complexity as well as cases involving high-volume plain-
tiffs. Pilot judges also have more trial experience. Case disposition could 
also affect the chance of being in a pilot group as dismissals are less com-
mon and trials and cases concerning claim construction are more common 
in the pilot group. After matching, there is no statistically significant effect 
of pilot status on cases being overruled in full or in part. 
Figure 9 
  
                                                                                                                           
 273 For details on the propensity score method, see id. 
 274 See supra notes 162–177 and accompanying text. 
574 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:519 
3. Limitations from Statistical Studies 
As with any statistical analysis, limitations exist in the data study. Any 
study of judicial decision making is necessarily influenced by other factors 
that may not be controlled for in the analysis. It is hard to tell whether the 
measure of specialization is the right one. Perhaps the most experienced 
judges are not showing up as “experienced” in the database because special-
ized judges are so versed in patent law that they have a special knack for 
encouraging settlements. In turn, a better method could exist for analyzing 
case complexity—the variable that would likely be the key confounding 
variable in this analysis in addition to the selection effect issue. Moreover, 
an analysis should account for the interaction between specialization and 
issue type.275 Technical expertise could also vary by case; judges with 
chemistry backgrounds would find them of little relevance if the invention 
concerns computers.276 The analysis also does not account for the fact that a 
judge’s law clerk may have scientific skills that could influence how the 
judge decides a given case.277 
The findings are sensitive to other variations in coding. Unless it is 
made explicit, for instance, how do we tell that the trial court’s invalidity 
ruling rests on a claim construction analysis if the CAFC summarily affirms 
the decision? This problem is especially acute when the CAFC decides a 
case by a Rule 36 opinion. The present analysis looks at the lower court’s 
decision to resolve this dilemma when it comes up, but it is impossible to 
determine on what basis the CAFC affirms when it does not issue a written 
opinion.278 
Moreover, the results depend on the issue actually appealed, and in 
some cases the CAFC may not resolve an issue if it is moot. For instance, 
the trial court may find that a patent is both invalid and not infringed. The 
CAFC’s decision, however, may discuss only infringement, because if that 
issue is resolved in the competitor’s favor, then the court need not rule on 
the merits of any affirmative defense, like invalidity or inequitable conduct. 
                                                                                                                           
 275 Although this study added in a judge’s “scientific” background in some specifications, the 
measure was dropped since so few district judges graduated with a bachelors degree in science or 
worked in the scientific field. Moreover, such a measure is necessarily crude, as a judge’s under-
graduate or graduate training in a science discipline may not be a reflection of scientific 
knowledge, and those with significant scientific expertise could be “hidden from view” when 
education is used as the sole metric. See Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1153 (considering how to 
“measure expertise”). 
 276 See id. (discussing the shortcomings of educational background as the measurement of 
expertise). 
 277 See Shartzer, supra note 29, at 230 (explaining the proliferation of technical law clerks). 
 278 See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1095 
n.146 (2010) (discussing the challenges with understanding the CAFC’s basis for Rule 36 affir-
mances). 
2019] Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation 575 
The CAFC may equally disagree with the invalidity decision, but because 
the issue is moot, it is not resolved, and thus the database would not include 
it. 
Additionally, a pressing issue is how to measure the dependent varia-
ble. By centering the dependent variable around the CAFC decision, the 
analysis implicitly makes the assumption that the CAFC decision is the 
“correct” one. Whether this assumption holds up empirically is up for de-
bate, as the CAFC may not necessarily make more “correct” decisions than 
the lower court. Further analysis could look at alternative dependent varia-
bles such as time to disposition so as to measure whether pilot judges may 
be more efficient in their decision making. 
Selection effects may also be at work, presenting the most concerning 
methodological difficulty in analyzing the workings of the pilot program. 
Patent case filings across various district courts are not a random sample, 
and as an element of trial strategy, a litigant may file in one district over 
another.279 Parties may engage in judge shopping.280 Some districts, like the 
Eastern District of Texas, facilitate this practice by letting parties essentially 
choose their judge by deciding in which division within the district to file, 
which could impact the results.281 Indeed, the Eastern District of Texas has 
continued this practice even though the rules of the pilot program officially 
provide for random assignment.282 In any event, the nature of the pilot pro-
gram assignment process makes it so that litigants know with at least a one-
third chance who will be their judge in some districts.283 
Appealed cases are also not representative and are more likely to be 
considered close cases.284 The type of litigant may correlate with the pro-
pensity to appeal.285 As Schwartz notes, generic pharmaceutical companies 
“may be more likely to appeal” due to the high stakes involved.286 Patent 
trolls may also approach litigation differently.287 Furthermore, the choice of 
whether to appeal is endogenous; in deciding whether to appeal, litigants 
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may consider the reputation and expertise of the trial court judge.288 Thus, 
sorting out the direction of causation can be difficult. 
Inconsistent joinder of parties could also bias the results. Historically, 
the Eastern District of Texas has interpreted loosely the joinder rules, allow-
ing parties to sue multiple defendants in the same suit.289 In other districts, 
however, the same type of suit would be considered multiple lawsuits in-
stead of one joint one.290 In recent years, Congress sought to address this 
issue through the America Invents Act (“AIA”) and the CAFC has tried to 
deal with the issue to little avail as the Eastern District of Texas simply al-
tered the way it consolidated cases.291 Additionally, the Eastern District of 
Texas also has a habit of allowing multiple defendants to be tried in the 
same trial.292 In 2015, Congress altered the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in an attempt to reduce the number of defendants sued by patent trolls.293 
These practices wreak havoc on any statistical model trying to predict be-
havior because we are comparing apples to oranges with the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas’s disparate practices. The results are the same whether the 
Eastern District of Texas is included in the analysis, but nonetheless, less 
obvious practices between courts could impact the results. 
Moreover, the procedural posture of the case could influence the pro-
pensity for the parties to settle. Defendant-patentees who are sued in declar-
atory judgment actions and parties who hold license agreements may be 
more willing to settle because they do not want to risk having their patents 
being invalidated.294 We also cannot underestimate the extent to which pub-
lic opinion and the status of the litigants in the wider society could influ-
ence results as well. Some patents are more societally useful than others and 
public opinion about a case could conceivably affect how courts rule. A case 
involving the Apple iPhone could implicate societal and public opinion 
concerns not present for other run of the mill patent cases on inventions not 
widely used. 
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Further, the CAFC’s inconsistent claim construction jurisprudence 
could cloud any statistical analysis.295 It is no secret among patent practi-
tioners that panels on the CAFC have at least two divergent approaches to 
claim construction, and that they use these approaches “interchangeably.”296 
High reversal rates or failure to find a statistically significant result could be 
as much about what panel at the CAFC hears the case as the experience of 
the pilot judge.297 Although the present analysis expands beyond claim con-
struction, understanding the claims is key in any infringement or validity 
analysis. To the extent district court judges are not given consistent guid-
ance, it is difficult to assess accurately how reversal rates may change with 
the pilot program. 
Some of these concerns may be overblown. Patent law is different than 
other litigation in terms of the stakes involved, so the selection effects 
measured by appeal rate may not be as worrisome. The American Intellec-
tual Property Law Association estimates that an individual patent lawsuit 
can cost upwards of three million dollars through the close of discovery 
when more than twenty-five million dollars is at risk.298 Such high stakes 
encourage parties to appeal no matter the circumstance or the identity of the 
judge or panel hearing the case.299 Moreover, the de novo nature of appel-
late review increases the propensity to appeal.300 Although statistical analy-
sis can try to deal with some of these concerns, recognition of the limits of 
statistical analysis to conclusively explain decision making is important in 
discerning how well the pilot program is working. 
                                                                                                                           
 295 See Etan S. Chatlynne, On Measuring the Expertise of Patent-Pilot Judges: Encouraging 
Enhancement of Claim-Construction Uniformity, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 
313 (2013) (testing whether the pilot program’s reduction in reversal rates could be “difficult” 
given the CAFC’s inconsistent claim construction jurisprudence). 
 296 Id. at 310; see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 67, at 1111 (observing two judicial 
theories on claim construction). 
 297 Chatlynne, supra note 295, at 321 (noting how “claim-construction reversal rates may be 
an erroneous indicator of success”). 
 298 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 
(2015) [hereinafter AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N]. The American Intellectual Property 
Law Association notes that patent suits can cost two million dollars when between one million 
dollars and ten million dollars is at stake, and as much as five million dollars when more than ten 
million dollars is at stake. Id.; see Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 
55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1483–84 (2014) (exploring the exorbitant costs associated with patent liti-
gation as opposed to other types of civil litigation). 
 299 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 298, at 37 (comparing the costs of 
litigation to the amount of money at risk in the suit). 
 300 Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?, supra note 66, at 244. 
578 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:519 
V. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
As companies increasingly rely on intellectual property assets as a 
source of revenue and strategic advantage, it is clear that we need to do 
more to resolve the levels of unpredictability and inaccuracy in the current 
system.301 Patent litigation is in a rapid ascent and costs of litigation are sky 
high.302 Though the patent law pilot program represents a sound attempt to 
achieve greater predictability and uniformity, so far, as this study indicates, 
it is only a first step at best in reducing errors on appeal. 
Despite the clear benefits brought about by specialization, the results 
of the pilot program five years out indicate that—at least as measured by 
reversal rates—specialized trial court tribunals are not offering a greater 
benefit to litigants than generalist ones. This realization should not close the 
door for the patent pilot project; indeed, some of the results are promising, 
suggesting ways in which the program could be adjusted to achieve its goals 
more expeditiously. In recent years, some districts, like the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, have exited from participating, finding that the program 
does not foster the benefits touted.303 Importantly, the FJC’s five-year report 
echoes the findings of the present analysis concerning the limited influence 
of the pilot program.304 But, there are ways to reform the program and the 
legal system for patents so as to achieve the pilot program’s goals. These 
reforms include the following: (1) altering the system to provide resources 
to individual judges irrespective of the district in which they sit; (2) reform-
ing patent law internally by focusing on rules and internal USPTO practic-
es; and (3) readjusting the system to give the USPTO more responsibility to 
make decisions on patent law. 
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A. Reform of the Patent Pilot Program 
A specialized patent judiciary may work but either the wrong judges 
are included in the current program or the current judges need more time to 
gain the necessary experience for the pilot program to bear fruit. Some dis-
trict courts, such as the Eastern District of Virginia or the District of Dela-
ware, have developed national reputations in patent law, and so their exclu-
sion from the pilot program is puzzling.305 Moreover, some district courts 
have developed regional expertise. According to the present analysis, Judge 
T.S. Ellis in the Eastern District of Virginia or Judge Nathaniel Gorton in 
the District of Massachusetts hear many patent cases. Also, the pilot pro-
gram may simply be allocating resources to the wrong judges, relying on 
district court numbers of patent litigation rather than looking at which indi-
vidual judges are actually developing expertise in patent law. Indeed, the 
initial bill authorizing the patent pilot program excludes about 85% of dis-
trict court judges from participating, including all district court judges with-
in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.306 A glaring omission is the District of 
Delaware, which is precluded from participating because it lacks the mini-
mum ten judgeships per program rules.307 
A finer-grained understanding of legal issues would assess where spe-
cialized courts help and where they do not. Schwartz found that over a 
longer period of time, compared to the present study, at least one de facto 
semi-specialized district court—the District of Delaware—had lower rever-
sal rates than other districts.308 But, it took Delaware many years for its 
judges to gain expertise. Regardless, reversal rates are heavily dependent on 
the case facts themselves. In order for the patent pilot program to work, 
more time must be afforded for judges to fully understand the intricacies of 
patent law. As Shartzer finds and the present results confirm, on an individ-
ual basis, the CAFC hears only a few cases each year, even those of judges 
participating in the pilot program, thereby reducing the opportunity for 
judges to get appropriate feedback from the CAFC.309 The pilot program 
may simply need more time to work. 
It is also not clear which barometer should be used to measure “suc-
cess.” Pilot judges may be more efficient, but studies conducted over a 
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longer period of time and with a larger data set could show more differences 
across issue types. Another problem may be that the pilot program improp-
erly equates experience with expertise whereas these concepts are distinct 
analytically.310 Quite possibly, the pilot program is helping judges gain 
more experience, but what the system really needs is judicial decision mak-
ers with greater expertise in the scientific fields at issue. Indeed, since the 
inception of the pilot program, only about 5% of all patent cases appointed 
a special masters or technical assistant, with 83% of those appointments 
occurring before pilot judges and most taking place in the Eastern District 
of Texas.311 There is always a chance that reliance on a technical expert or 
technical law clerk means that the judge depends on that expert to the det-
riment of the case. But, because lay judges often lack the technical know-
how to understand complex technologies without expert assistance, adding 
more resources to aid in that understanding may help the pilot better 
achieve its goals.312 Alternatively, segregating cases by the judge’s scientific 
subject matter expertise is also an option. 
Further, a panel of judges in the Northern District of Illinois discussing 
the pilot program was asked whether they believed that reversal rates are a 
good indicator of success.313 They argued that the issue of reversal rates had 
more to do with the CAFC than them.314 As one judge noted, the problem 
had to do with the unwillingness of the CAFC to defer to the lower courts, 
especially on issues like claim construction.315 One judge speaking about 
the pilot program opined that a better measure of success than reversal rates 
is talking with lawyers about their experiences before particular judges.316 
Indeed, instead of trying to work within the confines of the current ju-
dicial machinery, perhaps the time is ripe to consider more radical alterna-
tives, like creating a national-level specialized trial court akin to the U.S. 
Tax Court, a specialized tax tribunal located in Washington, D.C. whose 
judges “ride circuit” to hear cases regionally.317 Such an approach is not 
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new in American law; in addition to the Tax Court, the Court of Internation-
al Trade (“CIT”) and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims also provide special-
ized trial-level jurisprudence.318 Alternatively, a move to an adjudicatory 
system might also be desirable.319 
This move toward specialized trial courts would follow the lead of 
countries like England that have created a separate patent law trial court.320 
England has both a Patents Court and a Patents County Court—a newer 
patent-focused trial court with concurrent jurisdiction that has reduced wait 
times since its onset.321 Germany’s system authorizes certain district courts 
with “judges . . . experienced in intellectual property matters” to hear patent 
cases.322 These courts are known for their speed, often resolving cases in 
under a year.323 
In particular, it may be desirable to give greater jurisdiction to the 
USITC to resolve patent cases.324 Presently, USITC hears patent cases when 
a party files a complaint against a trade involving a patent infringement.325 
Winning in the USITC excludes the product from being imported into the 
United States and results in an order to cease and desist the infringing activ-
ity.326 The USITC is a desirable alternative for patent cases because it lacks 
a criminal and tort docket and is designated as an Article III court—an im-
portant attribute to consider because patent litigants have a right to a jury 
trial.327 
Further analysis is needed to assess whether the program has had the 
intended effect of reducing forum shopping. The FJC reports that four pilot 
districts—the Eastern District of Texas and the Central, Northern, and 
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Southern Districts of California—all saw greater patent filings relative to 
civil case filings.328 The results thus far do not suggest that the pilot pro-
gram has reduced forum shopping.329 Some notable districts, such as the 
Eastern District of Virginia and the Western District of Wisconsin, are popu-
larly known as “rocket dockets” due to their speed and efficiency in resolv-
ing all cases, not just patent ones.330 Thus, litigants still have an incentive to 
file in those districts. Moreover, some districts, such as the Eastern District 
of Texas, have a reputation for being pro-patentee due to the series of local 
rules they have adopted.331 In the Eastern District of Texas, for instance, 
now retired Judge T. John Ward required parties to turn over discovery at 
the onset, sanctioning them if they failed to comply.332 Moreover, he re-
quired both parties to come up with a list of agreed upon claim terms, thus 
narrowing the number of terms in dispute.333 The pilot program could fix 
this problem of inconsistent rules by requiring districts subscribing to the 
program to adhere to universal local patent rules. Further, some pilot pro-
gram districts have a greater percentage of their judges participating in the 
program than other pilot program districts. Thus, litigants know a priori that 
in some districts there is very high chance of getting a pilot judge whereas 
in other districts the odds are much lower due to the smaller percentage of 
pilot judges per total number of district judges.334 Additionally, nothing in 
the law actually requires litigants to file in any particular forum, and so it 
appears, at least on first blush, that the pilot program has not mitigated fo-
rum shopping as much as intended. But, simple reforms could help alleviate 
the problem. 
In addition to requiring nationwide, uniform patent rules, recent devel-
opments in patent law jurisprudence may help alleviate forum shopping 
concerns irrespective of any pilot program. In 2017, in T.C. Heartland LLC 
v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, the Supreme Court narrowed how the 
patent venue statute should be read, holding that a domestic corporation 
only “resides” in its state of incorporation.335 Prior to the decision, a plain-
tiff could sue in any district where an infringing product was sold, making it 
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easy for almost any plaintiff to sue in the patentee-friendly Eastern District 
of Texas.336 In interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision, in September 
2017, the CAFC further narrowed the Eastern District of Texas’s interpreta-
tion of the venue provisions, requiring a tightly-linked physical nexus in 
order for a party to sue in that district.337 The T.C. Heartland decision and 
the subsequent CAFC decision may do more to alter plaintiff filing behavior 
and have more of an impact on alleviating forum shopping—if interpreted 
strictly—than any pilot program. “In the immediate aftermath of the [T.C. 
Heartland] decision, filings in the Eastern District of Texas . . . decreased, 
but filings in the District of Delaware . . . increased,” resulting in 40% of all 
patent filings remaining in those two districts—the same percentage as be-
fore the Supreme Court’s decision.338 
B. Reforming Patent Law Internally 
Patent law—and its emphasis on interpreting the patent’s claims— 
may be too indeterminate for proper resolution because little common un-
derstanding of claim terms exists through either definitional or legal stand-
ards.339 Patent office rules have not kept up with modern times as the 
USPTO requires that claims be drafted within “a single sentence, regardless 
of the number of clauses or concepts.”340 Courts are required to interpret the 
claims as “one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”341 But, because the 
judge is often a person who is not of ordinary skill in the art, claim con-
struction amounts to an impossible task.342 
As such, if the system continues to rely on generalist judges to decide 
patent cases, more resources should be added at the trial court level to aid in 
interpretation. The federal judiciary could follow the lead of other countries, 
such as Japan, and set up blue-ribbon panels composed of university re-
searchers and experts from the private sector to advise on cases.343 Special-
ized intellectual property divisions of the trial courts in Tokyo and Osaka 
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now hear more than three-quarters of patent cases in Japan. 344 Technical 
assistants, akin to USPTO examiners, aid judges in deciding cases.345 For 
instance, to aid judges in understanding complex technology, the Japanese 
Intellectual Property High Court, the appellate body similar to the CAFC, 
created an “Expert Commissioner System” that includes “over 140 re-
searchers and experts” from academia and both the public and private sec-
tors.346 
The USPTO can play its part in reforming the system by encouraging 
or even requiring patentees to provide more real-world guidance on the con-
tent of the patent claims and what the actual invention entails in plain Eng-
lish. Further, with the rise of technology, perhaps the time is ripe to start 
thinking of alternative ways to supplement the record to identify what the 
invention covers, how it differs from the prior art, and what it actually does. 
Video of how an invention works in practice could be considered part of the 
record as a supplement to the plain meaning of the words to aid in interpret-
ing what the patent covers. 
The problem also lies in part with the CAFC. It has “near-total authori-
ty” over how patent policy is implemented in this country, in contrast to 
appellate jurisdiction in most other areas of law, where cases are heard in 
dispersed, regional appellate courts.347 As Jonathan S. Masur notes, the 
CAFC: 
[H]as been roundly criticized for promulgating overly formalistic 
doctrines that ignore pragmatic considerations, tolerating uncer-
tainty and confusion on key points of law, enhancing the power of 
patent holders to the point of diminishing innovation, and failing 
to distinguish technological fields in which patents are necessary 
from those in which they are not.348  
In fact, scholars predicted that the pilot program would not be a success 
because the CAFC’s jurisprudence lacks consistency.349 R. Polk Wagner and 
Lee Petherbridge contend that CAFC claim construction is “panel-
dependent” as their empirical analysis reveals that the CAFC has two dif-
ferent modes of claim construction.350 This heavy panel-dependent nature of 
claim construction jurisprudence at the CAFC may lead to less stability and 
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clarity of jurisprudence for lower courts to apply. Moreover, whatever con-
sistent precedent the CAFC does come up with may not be translated to the 
lower courts in an optimal matter, as the CAFC may do a poor job of trans-
lating precedent into workable principles for district courts to apply.351 In-
deed, district judges bemoan that they do not receive any “real guidance” 
from the CAFC.352 The CAFC could do more to strengthen the currently 
tenuous connection between formation of precedent and its application by 
adopting more supervision over the lower courts. As Rochelle Dreyfuss ar-
gues, the CAFC could engage in a more in-depth assessment of a district’s 
court fact-finding, better oversee lower court judges, and hear more inter-
locutory appeals.353 Moreover, express recognition of the factual underpin-
nings of claim construction could lower the high reversal rate by the CAFC 
irrespective of specialized courts.354 
C. Administrative Reform 
Finally, the solution may lie in changing the focus of the entire system 
to leverage administrative expertise in deciding patent cases. Unlike other 
areas of law, like torts, in which legislatures are very active, patent law is 
characterized by an “overmatched judiciary and an absent legislature.”355 
Reform of the patent system must be multi-institutional, focusing on the 
role that Congress, the administrative bureaucracy, and the courts play in 
implementing policy. The current system puts too much power in the hands 
of the CAFC as a promulgator of policy by not installing inferior institu-
tions, such as the USPTO and the lower federal courts, while not providing 
the CAFC with the adequate support necessary for it to actually formulate 
policy.356 
The current patent system gives too much judicial discretion to courts, 
allowing them to run rampant in crafting legal doctrine. Some argue that 
complexity in patent law is no different than in other fields.357 Even the Su-
preme Court has hinted that it prefers that patent law not be treated differ-
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ently, but the question remains why patent law is different than other fields 
of law, like environmental law, where a federal administrative agency has 
plenary authority.358 Unlike areas of law, such as securities, pharmaceuti-
cals, transportation, and environmental, patent law remains an outlier in that 
it is a “highly technically complex regulatory field controlled entirely by 
courts.”359 Masur argues that the time has come to bring patent law’s institu-
tional arrangements in line with the rest of the administrative state by, inter 
alia, empowering the USPTO with greater rulemaking authority.360 
Courts—even specialized courts—may simply find themselves poorly 
equipped to understand deeply the intricacies of patent law and its applica-
tion to new and emerging technologies. Scientifically untrained judges and 
their law clerks may lack the institutional and technical capability to weigh 
whether an invention is obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art.361 Pa-
tent law involves two layers of technical competence: considering the eco-
nomic consequences of setting the rule and an application of the rule to the 
technical facts of a case.362 Specialized trial courts do not solve either prob-
lem; decision makers in these courts do not apply the right rule, or lack the 
technical competence to devise the rule in the first place.363 Thus, instead of 
relying on the federal courts to decipher legal rules for patent cases, the task 
could instead be given to the very experts for whom the taxpayers pay to 
oversee the patent system: the USPTO or another administrative agency 
suitable for the job.364 
Patent law is different statutorily from other fields where courts can ef-
fectively implement policy. The Patent Act sets the broad, outer bounds for 
patentability and infringement, but the courts decide how those principles 
apply.365 To do so, the courts have created and applied doctrines based on 
their understanding of how patent policy should be implemented.366 But, 
courts devise such doctrines piecemeal without full consideration of how to 
properly balance patent rights versus innovation. Giving power to the courts 
would be appropriate if the Patent Act was already clear about what eco-
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nomic and societal judgments courts should make in determining validity.367 
But, the Patent Act is vague and has not been amended in over seventy-five 
years, meaning that it predates the immense technological innovation that 
has occurred since then, especially in the software and medical fields.368 
Courts simply have no guidance or expertise to weigh the often competing 
demands of encouraging innovation and protecting property rights. 
Moreover, some scholars argue that patents should function differently 
across different industries, with some industries benefiting from broader 
benefits and others needing narrower ones to encourage innovation.369 Dan 
L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley argue that courts already have the necessary 
tools, in the form of what they call “patent levers,” to adjust patent scope 
depending on the industry.370 But, the disparate nature of decision making—
combined with the CAFC’s failure to embrace its role as a patent policy-
maker as opposed to being solely an adjudicator—necessarily results in pa-
tent policy being left in disarray. Courts may have the tools at their disposal 
to properly make patent policy, but the CAFC and the district courts quite 
simply have not embraced their role in making the patent system work. 
Other institutional actors are similarly ill-equipped to carry out policy. 
Congress could legislate to ensure divergent standards depending on the 
industry, but relying on a legislative solution in this circumstance is imprac-
tical and involves too much administrative cost and uncertainty.371 Technol-
ogy changes too often for Congress to keep up with it.372 Additionally, most 
of the inquiries needed to dictate rules are fact-specific, requiring case-by-
case application.373 The problem of intense industry lobbying may also re-
sult in policy that better reflects special interest influence rather than sound 
economic policy on what actions actually encourage innovation.374 Con-
gress’s foray into legislating patent law—the Biotechnological Process Pa-
tents Act of 1995, which codifies “that biotechnological processes that use 
or result in a novel and nonobvious product are always nonobvious”—
illustrates the role that special interests play in the process.375 
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Rather than the CAFC or Congress setting forth rules for guiding va-
lidity, the USPTO could instead use its rulemaking power to make more 
explicit how patent claims should be construed and how the results vary 
depending upon technology.376 The USPTO has not exercised its limited 
rulemaking power, thus relegating the power to decide many questions con-
cerning patent laws to the courts.377 But, in order to understand whether an 
invention should be patentable requires a thorough understanding of not 
only the technology in question but also the economic markets involved to 
properly resolve the balance between innovation and protection.378 Con-
gress may also want to delegate to the agency the power to treat different 
classes of subject matter differently, by, for instance, allowing patents on 
software to last for shorter time periods than those on pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, which would address the different incentives in each industry regard-
ing innovation.379 USPTO examiners with thousands of hours of experience 
in surveying patents across a range of technologies would be most equipped 
to decide whether a patent is valid or at least provide better guidance via 
rulemaking on how claims in particular fields should be construed. Moreo-
ver, the USPTO is best equipped to keep up with modern technology and 
the evolution of claim interpretation. 
Reform of the system in an administrative fashion mirrors what many 
other countries already do with respect to their patent jurisprudence. Rather 
than rely on specialized judges, most of whom do not have scientific train-
ing, reallocation of the task—at least on validity determinations—could be 
given to a federal agency. The courts would then be tasked with following 
these rules and would instead focus their energy on adjudicating infringe-
ment disputes rather than worrying about construing claims or making inva-
lidity determinations. The results of the present analysis indicate that most 
mistakes concern either claim construction or validity determinations; 
courts do a pretty good job in infringement analysis, so a proposal where 
administrative agencies undertake more of the scientific analysis may be a 
better path. Cohen et al., for instance, propose a Patent Litigation Review 
Board that they argue would “discourage . . . weak patent infringement 
suits[,] . . . strengthen the hands of patentees[,] . . . flag weaknesses [in the 
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patent,] . . . and . . . provide policymakers with more . . . information” to 
evaluate the patent system.380 
Adaptation of rulemaking comes at the expense of judicial discretion 
and flexibility.381 But, what are the benefits of flexibility in this current situ-
ation that could not otherwise be realized by the PTO? One concern is that 
the time involved in rulemaking could necessitate delay in getting answers 
in patent disputes. Such a concern is not trivial and the current system of 
court action may give quicker answers, but those answers are not necessari-
ly correct or consistent. 
The administrative trend toward patent law reform has been set in mo-
tion by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oil States Energy Ser-
vices, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.382 In this case, the Court held 
that the inter partes review process undertaken by the USPTO is constitu-
tional and does not violate either “Article III or the Seventh Amendment of 
the Constitution.”383 In inter partes review, parties can contest the validity 
of a patent, though there is not currently an administrative system where 
parties could resolve disputes entirely at the PTAB rather than through the 
courts.384 In other words, if parties have infringement issues, they must still 
proceed through the court system, even though they could contest validity at 
the PTAB instead of the courts.385 In total, as of February 2019, the PTAB 
had received over 8,000 PTAB petitions challenging patent validity under 
procedures instituted under the AIA.386 In the coming years, how the district 
courts interact with this new system and whether parties choose to resolve 
validity disputes at the PTAB instead of the district courts will impact how 
the pilot program turns out. For instance, instead of filing before pilot judg-
es, litigators may instead elect to file a petition before the PTAB. It is im-
possible to tell how much the inter partes process will cannibalize validity 
decision making in the district courts.387 Some scholars have found that the 
                                                                                                                           
 380 Cohen et al., supra note 18, at 1782–83 (setting forth the proposed new agency and noting 
that it would offer “non-binding assessments” of claim construction, infringement, unenforceabil-
ity, and validity issues). 
 381 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 366, at 1639 (weighing various degrees of discretion in 
rule-based and standards-based statutory regimes). 
 382 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 
(2018) (upholding inter partes review by the USPTO). 
 383 Id. 
 384 See id. at 1370–72 (describing the inter partes review process). 
 385 In a separate article, I compare and contrast outcomes between validity undertaken through 
inter partes review compared to the district court. See Amy Semet, Comparing Inter Partes Re-
view with District Court Proceedings in Patent Law (working paper) (on file with author) (com-
paring district court cases with cases decided in inter partes review). 
 386 This information was compiled from Lex Machina. See LEX MACHINA, supra note 194. 
 387 For more on the inter partes process, see Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, 
The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3129560 [https://perma.cc/P7PR-JVGQ]. 
590 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:519 
majority of parties are substituting the PTAB process for district court liti-
gation, at least when their claims concern validity.388 The Oil States decision 
paves the way for altering the PTAB process to expand its reach.389 The 
long-term viability of the pilot project may come down to how the program 
intersects with that process. 
In all, a fundamental rebalancing of the system to place decision mak-
ing back in the hands of experts would do much to balance out the entire 
system to get better results. As Arti K. Rai argues, “[i]f greater fact-finding 
and policy application expertise were vested at the administrative and trial 
court levels, the role of appellate review within the patent system could 
substantially be reconceived.”390 The USPTO is already beginning to take 
these steps. Although a full examination of the issue is beyond the scope of 
this Article, inter partes review—where a third party can challenge the va-
lidity of a patent before the PTO—may be a mechanism that should be used 
more frequently to gauge validity of patents in a consistent manner. This 
study’s preliminary analysis of inter partes review reveals that many patents 
are declared invalid before the PTO, yet district courts continue to find that 
parties infringe them. Some courts even find the patents valid, contrary to 
the PTO’s conclusion. The system needs to do better. A system where the 
USPTO shapes, as much as possible, the validity determinations would cre-
ate greater consistency and predictability in patent law decision making.391 
CONCLUSION 
The patent law system needs reform.392 Given the high volume of cas-
es and the monetary stakes involved, the system is too unpredictable. Re-
cent attempts to solve the problem by encouraging specialized expertise in 
the patent system are a promising first step, but do not go far enough. Alt-
hough the results in this study do not indicate that specialization translates 
into more accurate decision making, the jury is still out for the final verdict, 
as we need to give the pilot project more time for judges to adapt to the pi-
lot. Moreover, by refocusing resources toward regional judges who hear 
many patent cases, the program might achieve greater accuracy on appeal. 
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The time is also ripe to ask whether radical alternatives are necessary; that 
is, instead of adjudicating patent cases through the judicial system, engag-
ing in a more vigorous debate about whether patent law should be drastical-
ly altered to give more power back to the administrative agency, which 
could then leverage its technical expertise to properly resolve patent cases, 
at least in part. Ultimately, the time has come for a discussion on whether a 
nationally-based specialized trial court is a better alternative to the recent 
patent pilot program. 
  
 
